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ANTI-DIVERSION RULES IN ANTIDUMPING
PROCEDURES: INTERFACE OR SHORT-
CIRCUIT FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF
INTERDEPENDENCE?
Edwin Vermulst
Paul Waer*
How can we possibly go to other countries and say, "Don't violate the
GATT," if we cavalierly and flagrantly violate it ourselves.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the European Communities (EC) amended its antidump-
ing law to adopt a distinct procedure enabling it to counter what it
perceived to be circumvention of antidumping duties through the set-
ting up of "screwdriver" plants in the Common Market. In 1988 the
United States amended its antidumping law by allowing action against
a multiplicity of corporate practices that it considers constitute strate-
gies aimed at circumventing antidumping duties. The other two prin-
cipal users of antidumping laws, Canada and Australia, have not -
thus far - followed the lead of the EC and the United States. 2 It
seems likely, however, that sooner or later similar stipulations will be
espoused by these jurisdictions.
In Geneva there would seem to be a consensus that certain forms
of diversion should be dealt with explicitly in the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Anti-Dumping Code.3 The four main
users of antidumping laws in varying degrees feel that diversion con-
* Edwin Vermulst is a graduate of the Universities of Utrecht (LL.B. 1978, LL.M. 1983)
and Michigan (LL.M. 1984; SJ.D. 1986); Paul Waer is a graduate of the Universities of Antwerp
(Lic. Jur. 1981), Hitotsubashi (LL.M. 1985) and Harvard (LL.M. 1987). Both practice law in
Brussels. The authors would like to thank Gary Horlick, Mark Koulen, Ronald Lorentzen,
Richard Gottlieb, Geoffrey Oliver, Richard Moreland and David Palmeter for their helpful ex-
planations and for their excellent comments on previous drafts. The authors, however, are solely
responsible for the views expressed in this article, which covers developments up to May 11,
1990.
1. HEARINGS ON H.R. 4696, HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2
(1986) (Statement of Clayton Yeutter, United States Trade Representative).
2. Both, however, have occasionally acted de facto against diversion: Canada by including
parts and components within the scope of an antidumping duty order on the finished product and
Australia by applying its normal customs classification rules. See infra notes 180-94 and accom-
panying text for more details.
3. GATT, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (1979), BISD, 26 Supp. 171 (1980).
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cerns a "new reality" which the present Code does not adequately ad-
dress. Other Code signatories, in many cases victims of antidumping
action, on the other hand, presumably favor multilateral regulation
above unilateral interpretations by the four main users.4 However,
even with the end of the Uruguay Round in sight, the GATT Con-
tracting Parties are miles apart on what actually constitutes diversion.
A GATT panel, instituted at the request of Japan in 1988 to scruti-
nize the GATT-consistency of the EC's parts amendment, communi-
cated its findings to the EC and Japan on March 2, 1990, and to the
other GATT Contracting Parties on March 22, 1990. As has been
widely reported,5 the GATT Panel has ruled that the measures taken
pursuant to the EC provision violate GATT rules.
Part II of this article will diagnose the phenomenon of diversion in
the context of antidumping law. Parts III and IV will address the
present approaches towards diversion in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Communities respectively. Part V will briefly compare the
Australian and Canadian approaches. Part VI will evaluate the as-
sorted propositions made in the Uruguay Round. Part VII will probe
the GATT Panel report on the EC's parts amendment and its possible
repercussions for the anti-diversion debate in GATT. Part VIII will
provide conclusions and suggest possible improvements.
II. DIVERSION: A TOPOGRAPHY
For the purposes of this article, we will define "diversion" as con-
duct undermining the policy objective of antidumping laws while,
strictly speaking, not falling within the definition of the sanctionable
conduct as defined in current antidumping legislation. The "diver-
sion" precludes the remedies imposed from being effective and accord-
4. In that respect, they have perhaps learned a lesson from what has happened over the last
decade in the sales below cost area. For a concise description of sales below cost in GATT, see
Koulen, Some Problems of Interpretation and Implementation of the GA 7T Anti-Dumping Code,
in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 366, 368 (J. Jackson & E.
Vermulst eds. 1989) [hereinafter ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE].
5. See Buchan, GA 77 Upholds Japanese Complaint Against EC, Financial Times, Mar. 10/
11, 1990, at 2, col. 2 (weekend edition); EC Mum on Press Report That It Lost GA T Case, Wall
St. J., Mar. 12, 1990, at 2, col. 5 (Eur. ed.); Thomson, Japan Hopes GAIT Ruling Ends EC
'Discrimination', Financial Times, Mar. 13, 1990, at 9, col. 1; Dullforce, GATT Backs Japan over
Anti-Dumping Duties, Financial Times, Mar. 29, 1990, at 24, col. i; Buchan, Brussels Attacks
"Narrow" GAIT Dumping Ruling, Financial Times, Mar. 30, 1990, at 4, col. 1; Wolf, EC May
Amend "Screwdriver" Legislation After GA 77 Upholds Japanese Complaint, Wall St. J., Mar. 30,
1990, at 2, col. 4 (Eur. ed.); Montagnon & Kellaway, EC Refuses to Adopt GA7T Report on
Dumping, Financial Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at 18, col. 1; Dullforce, Brussels at Odds with GA77
over Judgment, Financial Times, Apr. 4, 1990, at 4, col. 1; EC Commissioners Criticize GAT
Panel in Antidumping Case, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1990, at 2, col. 6 (Eur. Ed.); Montagnon &
Kellaway, The 'Predators' and the Investors, Financial Times, Apr. 9, 1990, at 16, col. 3. See
supra notes 220 and accompanying text for analysis of the GATT panel report.
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ingly diminishes the practical impact and meaning of the legal
provision. "Diversion" thus defined includes both "avoidance" and
"evasion" of antidumping duties. "Circumvention" will be used as a
functional equivalent of "evasion."
There are two alternative ways to assess the problem of diversion.
The first one is that conduct falling outside the ambit of what is legally
defined to be sanctionable conduct, by definition, is non-sanctionable
conduct. In this view, the legislature (or judiciary) cannot escape its
responsibility to define clearly the law without jeopardizing legal pre-
dictability, considered to be a cornerstone of every civilized legal sys-
tem and a pre-condition for rational human behavior.
The other view is that the law is necessarily an expression of un-
derlying policy objectives. Subjects to the law should not be permitted
to thwart the obvious policy objectives of the law by verbal architec-
ture, and the administering authorities should be given sufficient lee-
way to counter such behavior. Within the context of antidumping
legislation, however, it will not always be crystal-clear to subjects to
the law exactly where the border lies between illegitimate "evasion" of
the law by an intrusion upon the "clear" policy objectives of the law,
and legitimate and necessary "avoidance" of sanctionable conduct.
Indeed, the nucleus of most of the anti-diversion debate involves prac-
tices on the borderline of the current legal definition of sanctionable
dumping, and it is not always apparent whether the policy objectives
stop at or surpass the limits of this legal definition.
Both approaches lead to the conclusion that the anti-diversion de-
bate necessarily touches upon the notion of the sanctionable conduct
itself, be it as defined in current legislation or as targeted by the policy
objectives, both of which should ideally coincide. Indeed, where it is
felt that the legal definition of the sanctionable conduct is no longer
adequate to secure the attainment of the policy objectives of the law,
the obvious solution is to redefine the sanctionable conduct in legisla-
tion. However, this process presupposes that the policy objectives
themselves are clearly delineated. Hence, redefining and adapting the
legal definition of sanctionable dumping to deter "diversion" compels
a debate on the clear demarcation of the underlying policies and an
examination of the concepts and sanctions employed in current an-
tidumping legislation.
In the remainder of this section, the authors will discuss diversion-
ary practices in general terms in conjunction with the handicaps inher-
ent in the sanctions and concepts used in contemporary antidumping
legislation.
Summer 1990]
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A. "Diversion" Related to the Product Scope of the Antidumping
Measures: Product Alterations (sidestream diversion), Imports
of Parts and Subassemblies (upstream diversion) and Imports
of Finished Products Incorporating a Dumped Component
(downstream diversion)6
According to article 2(1) and article 3(5) of the GATT Anti-
Dumping Code, the imposition of antidumping measures requires a
finding of dumping and resulting injury with regard to the "like prod-
uct." "Like product" is defined in article 2(2) of the Code as "a prod-
uct which is identical, i.e., alike in all respects to the product under
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product
which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely
resembling those of the product under consideration."' 7 There is noth-
ing in the GATT or in the Code that prohibits an antidumping case
(or cases) from being brought against a broad range of products.8
However, where a complaint is brought against a variety of products
which are not "like products," it will be necessary to conduct separate
investigations of dumping and resulting injury with respect to each
"like product."9
Besides the "like product" definition, neither GATT article VI nor
the GATT Code contain any specific rules concerning the technicali-
ties of the imposition of antidumping duties as far as the product scope
is concerned. Therefore, within the outer limits of the "like product"
definition, administering authorities are free to define the product
scope of the investigation. Usually, in order to assist the customs au-
thorities who will eventually have to collect the antidumping duties,
the product scope is defined with reference to particular customs head-
ings. However, the definition of the "like product" need not necessar-
ily coincide with the customs classification of products and can be
broader or more narrow than a particular customs heading.
6. For a discussion, see also Bierwagen & Hailbronner, Input, Downstream, Upstream,
Secondary, Diversionary and Components or Subassembly Dumping, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 27
(June 1988).
7. See GATT, supra note 3, at 172-74. Compare J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT 414 (1969):
Essential to all of these expressions, however, is the concept "like products." It is only a
comparison of prices of "like products" that can show dumping and preparatory work sug-
gests that the use of this term in this article meant same product, in contrast to a somewhat
broader use of this term in other locations in the General Agreement.
8. Thus, for example, the massive number of antidumping and countervailing duty cases
brought by the U.S. steel industry in 1982 against a variety of products and countries were
perfectly within the international rules.
9. An exception is use of the product line provision foreseen in article 3(5) of the Code. The
conditions for invoking this exception, however, are understandably restrictive.
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A first area of "diversion" consists of imports of products which
fall outside the limits of the product scope of the antidumping meas-
ures. This kind of "diversion" can take various forms.
1. Product Alterations and "New Generation" Products' °
An exporter can try to escape the application of antidumping du-
ties on his products by making alterations to his products so that these
no longer fall within the product scope of the duties. He can do this
by downgrading or upgrading his product. Generally speaking, in
case of upgrading, the exercise will be worthwhile where the level of
antidumping duties is considerable, the cost of the upgrading (for ex-
ample, by adding additional features) is lower than the amount of the
antidumping duties, and the end-product can still be sold at a com-
mercially viable price."
In GATT terms the legal boundaries for the actionability of this
conduct lie within the "like product" definition. It seems obvious that
minor product alterations cannot be judged to result in a different
"like product." For example, a passenger car and the same passenger
car with a sunroof option essentially would still be "like products."
However, in certain cases there may have been particular reasons for a
given restrictive product definition. For example, an investigation can
be limited to imports of portable cassette players because there is no
injury being caused by imports of non-portable cassette decks. In this
case, apart from the problem of whether portable and non-portable
cassette players are "like products," a further complexity is introduced
by the question whether the result of the investigation would have
been different if it had covered a broader product range from the
outset.
"New generation" products raise similar - but more serious -
"like product" questions. For most consumer products it is normal
business practice to improve the products constantly and to introduce
new product series regularly, which sometimes differ from the old
products in terms of, for example, minor design changes and/or a few
additional options. The old and new series will generally not be con-
sidered to be different "like products" requiring a completely new in-
vestigation of dumping and resulting injury before antidumping duties
can be imposed. On the other hand, nobody will dispute that a com-
pact disc player cannot be considered as only a "new generation"
10. Example: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X.
Producer x in country X starts producing color televisions incorporating a timer.
11. The commercial viability of this operation depends of course also on considerations other
than price, such as consumer preferences.
Summer 1990] 1123
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product of a record player because they are clearly physically different
products with different characteristics utilizing different technolo-
gies.' 2 The factual constellations are, however, not always that clear.
For example, in the case of semiconductors it is not evident that a 16
K Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) chip and a 16 M
DRAM chip are still "like products." While both might be seen to
essentially perform the same basic functions, there is a tremendous
difference in memory capacity and, accordingly, a tremendous differ-
ence in the ability of both to perform these functions.13 Open-ended
product scopes (16 K and above) may effectively capture un-like
products.
2. "Upstream" Diversion' 4
When an antidumping duty is imposed on a finished product but
not on its parts or subassemblies, an exporter can elude the antidump-
ing duties on the finished products by moving upstream, and start ex-
porting parts and subassemblies which then can be assembled into the
finished product (by a related company) in the importing country.
Upstream diversion will especially become an attractive option when
the level of antidumping duties on the finished product is considerable
and the assembly costs in the importing country are not prohibitively
high. This "diversionary" conduct has shown to be rather prominent
in practice and has caused various responses by administering authori-
ties which will be discussed later in this article. It is also difficult to
tackle under current GATT antidumping law.
3. "Downstream" Diversion 5
When an antidumping duty is imposed on a certain product, the
exporter can also move downstream and start exporting further
processed forms of the product. Additionally, other producers of fur-
ther processed products could incorporate the dumped input into their
production. This relates to the issue of "input" or "secondary" dump-
ing. It should be noted that no international consensus exists on
12. Caveat: the Commerce Department, on the other hand, has held that portable electronic
typewriters are "like" portable electric typewriters. In the technical world of antidumping, noth-
ing seems impossible.
13. In the United States, the ITC in its preliminary injury determination, DRAMS of 256 K
and Above, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,475 (1986) (preliminary) determined that 256 K DRAMS and 1 M
DRAMS were like products.
14. Example: an antidumping duty is imposed on imports of color televisions from country
X. Producer x in country X starts exporting color picture tubes.
15. Example: an antidumping duty is imposed on color picture tubes from country X.
Producer x in country X starts exporting color televisions.
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whether input dumping is or should be actionable. Indeed, in the
Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices it has apparently been stated
that:
[t]he General Agreement was clear that there was no such thing as 'sec-
ondary dumping'. If one applied the normal GATT test, namely the
domestic price in the country of exportation, then the conclusion... was
that there was no dumping. The fact that certain inputs had been
dumped would not lead to the conclusion that, as far as the final product
was concerned, there had not been normal conditions of trade. The test
of cost of production would also lead to a no dumping conclusion be-
cause there was nothing abnormal in the fact that producers used im-
ports they could buy in the normal market under normal market
conditions even if these normal conditions implied dumping. The inves-
tigating authorities had to calculate production costs on the basis of the
real costs for the producer. In these circumstances the reply was clear
- at least under the General Agreement and the Code - there was no
dumping and nothing could be done about it.1 6
In the view of these authors, this statement is by and large correct.
However, an exception to this might be the situation where the pro-
ducer of the input and the finished product are the same or related and
where the input is "purchased" at a price which does not cover its cost
of production. This conclusion seems buttressed by an unpublished
draft recommendation of the Committee on Anti-Dumping Prac-
tices. 17 Nevertheless, such situations should be relatively rare. The
move into downstream products usually entails that the exporter move
into quite a different market and therefore this would probably not
occur frequently in practice.1 8
16. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, NOTES ON THE DRAFTING, INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT, at VI-3 (1984).
17. The recommendation is described in Hart, Dumping and Free Trade Areas, in AN-
TIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 334-35. See Bourgeois, EC Antidumping
Enforcement - Selected Second Generation Issues, in ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 563, 580-81 (B. Hawk ed. 1986). The latter
author equates input dumping with upstream dumping. In the terminology used by these au-
thors, input dumping should be characterized as downstream dumping.
18. Indeed, in "upstream" diversion the exporter can basically stay in the same market if the
assembly operations in the importing country are performed by the exporter (or by a related
company) because he will continue to sell the same (finished) product in the same market. In the
event of "downstream" diversion, the exporter will only stay in the same product market if
further processing operations were previously performed in the importing country. This would
be the case, for example, if "intermediate products" are subject to an antidumping duty which
previously were exported for captive use in processing operations in the importing country. The
exporter then can stop the further processing in the importing country and directly export the
"processed product."
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B. "Diversion" Related to the Concept "Products
from a Certain Country"19
A basic question touching upon the very notion of dumping itself is
whether, in defining dumping20 and imposing antidumping duties,21
the concept of "country of export" or "country of origin" should be
used as a yardstick. A separate, but related, issue is whether the sanc-
tions (imposition of antidumping duties) should necessarily be strictly
confined to the objectionable conduct (injurious dumping as defined,
among others, by the selection of the basis for determining normal
value).
The GATT and its implementing legislation would not seem to
provide a conclusive framework of limitations with regard to the prov-
enance of products which may be dumped and subjected to antidump-
ing duties. GATT article VI offers rather vague - one could even say
contradictory - descriptions. In article VI(l), for example, the Con-
tracting Parties recognize that:
dumping, by which products of one country are introduced into the com-
merce of another country at less than the normal value of the products,
is to be condemned .... A product is to be considered as being intro-
duced into the commerce of an importing country at less than its normal
value, if the price of the product exported from one country to another (a)
is less than the comparable price.... for the like product when destined
for consumption in the exporting country, or, (b) in the absence of such
domestic price, is less than either (i) the highest comparable price for
the like product for export to any third country .... or (ii) the cost of
production of the like product in the country of origin .... 22
Article VI(4) stipulates that "[n]o product of the territory of any con-
tracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting
party shall be subject to antidumping or countervailing duty .... -23
Similar language is used in articles VI(5) and VI(6).
In the view of these authors, article VI therefore does not provide a
19. Example 1: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X.
Producer x in country X sells and exports the color televisions to the related company yx in
country Y who exports the color televisions to the importing country. Producer x knows at the
moment of the sale that the color televisions will be exported by producer yx to the importing
country.
Example 2: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X. Producer x
in country X sells and exports the color televisions to the unrelated company y in country Y who
exports the color televisions to the importing country. Producer x does not know at the moment
of the sale that producer y will export the color televisions to the importing country.
20. In other words, the determination whether the sanctionable conduct occurs.
21. In other words, the molding of the sanction once the sanctionable conduct has been
determined to exist.
22. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct. 30, 1947, 62 Stat.
A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
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clear-cut answer to the question whether dumping should be defined
and antidumping duties imposed with respect to the country of "ori-
gin" or the country of "export" in cases where the two differ. The
explanation might be that the typical case which the drafters presuma-
bly had in mind in 1947 would have been the case where products are
(wholly) produced in one country and then exported (dumped) from
that country to the importing country.
The First Report of the Group of Experts, 24 established in 1958 to
examine the operation of antidumping laws in various countries, how-
ever, is more articulate. When discussing "export price," the Group
notes that "it seemed that the essential aim was to make an effective
comparison between the normal domestic price in the exporting coun-
try and the price at which the like product left that country .... ",25
Even more unequivocal is the Group's discussion of "indirect
dumping":
In their examination of the problem of the determination of the normal
value or the domestic market price in the exporting or the producing
country, the Group then considered the question of dumping of goods
where the exporting country is not the producing country of the goods con-
cerned. Most members of the Group reported that their countries had
little or no experience of indirect dumping and that, where legislation
existed to deal with this problem, the legislation had not been used. The
Group noted that since the wording of Article VI, paragraph ](a), referred
only to the comparable price in the exporting country, there was some
doubt whether action against indirect dumping was strictly in accordance
with the letter of the Agreement. However, despite this doubt, the Group
was generally of the opinion that it was reasonable for countries to have
the right to protect themselves against indirect dumping (whether of
processed or unprocessed goods) ..... 26
Perhaps as a result of the Group's discussion, a special provision was
devoted to this problem in the Kennedy 27 and the Tokyo 28 Round
Anti-Dumping Codes [Code]. Article 2(3) of the latter now provides:
In cases where products are not imported directly from the country of
origin but are exported to the country of importation from an intermedi-
ate country, the price at which the products are sold from the country of
export to the country of importation shall normally be compared with
the comparable price in the country of export. However, comparison
may be made with the price in the country of origin, if, for example, the
24. GATT, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, BISD, 8 Supp. 145 (1960).
25. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 148-49 (emphasis added).
27. See Article 2(c) of the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, in GATT, Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1967), BISD, 15
Supp. 24 (1968). See also J. JACKSON, supra note 7, at 416 (citations omitted).
28. See GATT, supra note 3.
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products are merely transshipped through the country of export, or such
products are not produced in the country of export, or there is no com-
parable price for them in the country of export. 29
The fact that the countries of "origin" and "export" need not neces-
sarily coincide, 30 a situation which is sometimes referred to as "indi-
rect dumping,"' 3' was therefore addressed by redefining the concept of
dumping through an alternative selection of normal value (based on
prices in the country of origin) in limited cases.
From the point of view of the concept of dumping and the preven-
tion of evasion of antidumping duties, the problem is a complex one.
On the one hand, it is in the exporting country that the "dumped"
prices are set.32 The transshipment provision is an exception to the
clear preference set out in article 2(1) of the GATT Anti-Dumping
Code for the normal value to be based on the "comparable price, in
the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporting country." On the other hand, if the ex-
porting country is the exclusive criterion used in defining dumping, a
supplier can easily manipulate the selection of normal value, and ac-
cordingly, the existence of dumping, by selecting a low normal value
29. Id. at 172.
30. Another problem arises where the producer and the exporter within the same country
differ, as will happen, for example, where sales are made through trading houses (as is sometimes
the case in Far Eastern countries such as Japan and Korea). A first distinction in that regard can
be made between sales to related and to unrelated trading houses. In the case of sales to related
trading houses, the corporate entity theory justifies the presumption that export prices set by the
trading house may be attributed to the producer. In the case of sales to unrelated trading houses,
a further distinction would appear necessary, i.e., whether the producer at the moment of sale
knew the destination of the product and therefore sold the product for export to a certain desti-
nation. If the answer is positive, the producer essentially sets a minimum export price and his
price to the trading house should be included in the calculation of the export price for purposes
of calculating his dumping margin (for EC cases to this effect, see, e.g., Ball Bearings and
Tapered Roller Bearings from Japan, 28 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 167) 3 (1985) (definitive);
Housed Bearing Units from Japan, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 221) 16 (1986) (provisional)). If
the answer is negative, the producer and the trading house should each get their own dumping
margin (for EC cases to this effect, see, e.g., Certain Chemical Fertilizer from the United States,
24 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 39) 4 (1981) (definitive); Certain Polypropylene Film from Japan, 25
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 172) 44 (1982) (undertakings, termination)). An exception to this
would be the situation where the producer sells to the trading house at a price which does not
cover his cost of production.
31. See GAT, supra note 24.
32. Indeed, how can a producer in country A who sells his merchandise to a trader in coun-
try B, without knowing the destination of the merchandise, be "condemned" for the possible
dumping by the trader? But see, e.g., Mercury from the Soviet Union, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 346) 27, 28 (1987) (definitive), where the EC Council took the opposite position:,
The Soviet exporter claimed that the mercury it exported was sold to international traders
and that it had no control over the final destination of the mercury. The investigation
showed that the exporter's terms of sale were CIF to a Community port. Furthermore, it
should be painted out that, for the purposes of the Community rules, the determining factor is
the effect of an exporter's behavior, not the search for intentions that could explain [sic] be-
hind such behavior. (emphasis added)
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"country of export." The above provision to some extent addresses
these concerns by widening the concept of dumping.
The GATT Code is again obscure on whether the antidumping
duties should be levied on products "exported from a certain country"
or on products with "origin in a certain country." Article 8(2) of the
GATT Anti-Dumping Code merely provides that:
[w]hen an antidumping duty is imposed in respect of any product, such
antidumping duty shall be collected in the appropriate amounts in each
case, on a non-discriminatory basis on imports of such products from all
sources found to be dumped and causing injury, except as to imports
from those sources, from which price undertakings under the terms of
this Code have been accepted. The authorities shall name the supplier or
suppliers of the product concerned. If, however, several suppliers from
the same country are involved, and it is impracticable to name all these
suppliers, the authorities may name the supplying country concerned. If
several suppliers from more than one country are involved, the authori-
ties may name either all the suppliers involved, or, if this is impractica-
ble, all the supplying countries involved.33
Logically, sanctions (antidumping duties) ought to be confined to
the specific sanctionable conduct itself (the dumping as defined by the
selection of normal value). In a transshipment case, for example, if the
normal value is determined with reference to the comparable price in
the country of export (there is no "obligation" to use the price in the
country of origin as the basis for normal value), the resulting an-
tidumping duties should also be confined to products exported from
that country. If subsequently, products of the same origin are ex-
ported from a different country, the determination of the existence of
dumping with regard to the exports of the previous country of export
cannot automatically be extended to these re-routed exports.
Despite these clear indications in a variety of GATT legislation, it
seems customary in jurisdictions such as the EC and the United States
to impose duties on producers and (a residual duty on) producing
countries.
1. The Residual Duty34
Article 8(2) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code provides that while
imposing an antidumping duty, "[t]he authorities shall name the sup-
33. See GATr, supra note 3, at 180. One could argue that use of the words "sources" and
"suppliers" indicates that antidumping duties ought to be imposed on the entities that "supply" c>
the products, i.e., the ones that sell the product (and therefore set the price). BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1291 (5th ed. 1979) defines "supplier" as "[a]ny person engaged in the business of
making a consumer product directly or indirectly available to consumers," while CURZON, A
DICTIONARY OF LAW (2d ed. 1983) defines "supplier" as "a person carrying on a business of
selling goods."
34. Example 1: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X. The
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plier or suppliers of the product concerned. If, however, several sup-
pliers from the same country are involved, and it is impracticable to
name all these suppliers, the authorities may name the supplying coun-
try concerned." '35
Most administering authorities seem to have interpreted the obli-
gation to name the suppliers rather liberally. Indeed, it has become
common practice to impose a residual duty as an easy catch-all provi-
sion of "all other imports," without there being any serious examina-
tion about whether it is really impracticable to name all the suppliers.
This practice seems largely inspired by concerns about the effective
enforcement of antidumping duties.36 The residual duty is an easy so-
lution to cover at the same time the problems of "non-cooperating"
and "newcomer" producers. It can be questioned whether both cate-
gories deserve to be caught in the same net. Indeed, the non-cooperat-
ing producers essentially had a choice to cooperate in the proceedings
but chose not to do so. According to article 6(8) of the GATT Anti-
Dumping Code, the administering authorities are then allowed to base
their preliminary and final findings "on the basis of the facts avail-
able."' 37 The "newcomers," i.e., producers which did not produce or
export during the investigation period used in the proceeding, essen-
tially could not cooperate in the proceeding, even if they had wished to
do so. These newcomers will then be subject to the antidumping duty
applying to "all other imports" without there having been any investi-
gation whether imports from these "newcomers" have actually been
residual duty will apply to producer x who did not cooperate in the proceeding (non-cooperating
producer).
Example 2: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X. The
residual duty will apply to producer x who did not export during the investigation period
(newcomer).
Example 3: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X. The
residual duty will apply to producer x who only started producing after the end of the
investigation period (newcomer).
35. See GATT, supra note 3, at 180.
36. See, e.g., Bourgeois, supra note 17, at 595:
Without a "residual" duty, there would be a major loophole creating a considerable risk of
circumvention. It would obviously make sense for exporting firm A, subject to an antidump-
ing duty of 20 percent, to channel its exports through firm X not subject to an antidumping
duty. This "residual" duty is generally set at the level of the duty applying to the exporter
with the highest duty for similar reasons. It would likewise make sense for A, subject to an
antidumping duty of 20 percent, assuming this is the highest, to channel its exports through
firm X, subject as an unnamed exporter to a residual duty of 10 percent.
37. Article 6(8) of the Code provides:
In cases in which any interested party refuses access to, or otherwise does not provide,
necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly impedes the investigation,
preliminary and final findings, affirmative or negative, may be made on the basis of the facts
available.
See GATT, supra note 3, at 178 (citations omitted).
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injuriously dumped.38 Moreover, the residual duty will often prove to
be an effective market entry barrier preventing "newcomers" to start
exporting at all!39
2. Third Country Production 4O
A producer could dodge the application of antidumping duties by
starting to produce its merchandise in and export it from a third coun-
try which is not covered by an antidumping duty.41 This move will
not necessarily shield the producer from exposure to future antidump-
ing investigations. However, if the shifting of production is also based
on comparative advantage considerations and combined with effective
export price monitoring, it may not only offer the producer a tempo-
rary alternative route of supply but also place the producer in a better
position to face any future investigations.
The most controversial forms of third country production are cases
in which the producer in its third country production essentially relies
on parts and subassemblies originating in the country subject to an-
tidumping duties and the production operations carried out in the
third country are of a marginal nature. Such cases are sometimes
38. In this respect, it is interesting to note the recent change in EC practice. In the EC,
"newcomers" have in recent years traditionally been subjected to the residual duty which is set at
the level of the highest duty imposed. See Bourgeois, supra note 17, at 597, who provides the
following logic for this policy choice:
In general, the Commission has not considered it possible to take special measures for new
exporters. It is indeed difficult to make determinations with respect to a firm that has not
exported to the Community. In addition, if any new exporter were to be investigated this
would either lead to continuous extensions of the proceeding or re-opening of proceedings,
which would hardly be in the interest of the other parties. This approach can be disadvanta-
geous to the new exporter but on balance it does not appear unreasonable if one bears in
mind that if a new exporter begins to export to the Community, it may be appropriate to
apply the provisions of the Antidumping Regulation relating to refunds of antidumping
duties and to reviews. As a rule, however, the new exporter would have to show a "track-
record" of no dumping or of lower dumping than the highest dumper for at least one year
before he would be eligible for a review.
See also Sodium Carbonate from the United States of America, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
311) 26 (1984), where the Commission reversed its previous practice to consider undertakings
offered by new exporters regarding possible future exports. The issue is on the agenda in the
bilateral GATT consultations between Hong Kong and the EC, initiated by Hong Kong in the
aftermath of the Video Cassette Tape case under article 15(2) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code,
in which case the EC Commission under pressure of the Hong Kong government retraced its
steps and declared its willingness to initiate "without delay" a review for newcomers. Video
Cassette Tapes from Korea and Hong Kong, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 174) 6 (1989).
39. For a more detailed discussion, see P. WAER, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES' EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL POLICY (forthcoming 1990).
40. Example: an antidumping duty is imposed on color televisions from country X.
Producer x in country X starts producing color televisions in and exporting them from country
Y.
41. Even if antidumping duties are in place with respect to the third country, it might still
make sense to start producing there if the antidumping duties (or, indeed the costs of production)
are significantly lower.
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viewed as attempts to evade the antidumping duties and one could
argue that these third country imports ought to be subjected to an-
tidumping duties without a new full-fledged investigation into dump-
ing and injury.
3. The Multinational Corporation Problem42
The multinational corporation problem arises in situations where
low-priced exports originating in a given country are cross-subsidized
through profits realized by the same producer (through a related com-
pany) in a third country. The objections to this practice seem to go
back to the assumption that dumping can only occur in a world econ-
omy characterized by imperfect competition, namely where "market
isolation" prevents re-importation of the dumped products. The "un-
fair advantage" enjoyed by the producer does not necessarily have to
take place in the country of production or export but can take place in
any market. As long as it accrues to the same producer (even through
a related company), it justifies the assumed economic rationale to
sanction the "dumping." The issue at stake is the very notion of dump-
ing itself, in particular whether the antidumping law should evolve
into a worldwide price discrimination prohibition and whether it is
appropriate that a particular importing country should be allowed to
sanction this conduct by the imposition of antidumping duties.
C. "Diversion" Related to the Dormant "Third Country
Dumping Provision"43
Material injury can be caused to a domestic industry in a third
country as a result of dumping which occurs in another importing
country. Such injury can take various forms. It can consist of a re-
duction in exports by the domestic industry in the third country to the
importing country. More complicated is the situation where injury is
caused by components being dumped in the importing country where
they are incorporated in a finished product which is subsequently ex-
ported to a third country where it causes material injury to the domes-
tic industry (either of the components or of the finished product).
GATT article VI(6)(b) already provides that the Contracting Par-
42. Example: producer x produces color televisions in countries X, Y and Z. He is able to
make high profits on sales in country X, but does not sell the color televisions in countries Y and
Z. He makes low(er) profits on export sales of color televisions from countries Y and Z.
43. Example 1: producer x in country X dumps color televisions in country Y. Producer z's
exports to country Y suffer material injury.
Example 2: producer x in country X dumps color picture tubes in country Y. Producer y in
country Y produces color televisions, incorporating the color picture tubes, and exports them to
country Z.
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ties may permit a Contracting Party to impose antidumping duties to
offset dumping which causes injury to the domestic industry of an-
other Contracting Party. Article 12 of the GATT Anti-Dumping
Code" confirms this, but then adds:
The authorities of the importing country in considering such an applica-
tion shall consider the effects of the alleged dumping on the industry
concerned as a whole in the third country; that is to say the injury shall
not be assessed in relation only to the effect of the alleged dumping on
the industry's exports to the importing country or even on the industry's
total exports.45
In practice, article 12 has remained a dead letter, despite its potentially
broad scope of application.
In the current anti-diversion debate, it seems few efforts are being
made to revive or expand this provision. Indeed, it would seem that
any such debate would result in a discussion about a worldwide "fair"
price control system. In a system such as GATT which essentially
promotes "free market" principles and deregulation of world trade,
the desirability and, moreover, practicability of such venture is bound
to meet with cynicism and opposition.
III. THE U.S. APPROACH TOWARDS DIVERSION
The U.S. adopted an explicit anti-circumvention provision only in
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Prior to that,
however, the U.S. in practice already used a variety of mechanisms to
answer perceived diversion. Both these and the 1988 provision will be
discussed in the following section.
A. The 1974 MNC Provision
Section 773(d) of the 1930 Tariff Act, as amended by the 1974
Trade Act,46 provides a special rule for calculating normal value (for-
eign market value or FMV in U.S. terminology) in the case of multina-
tional corporations:
44. Article 12 was reproduced from the Kennedy Round Code. See GATT, supra note 27, at
34.
45. See GATT, supra note 3, at 183. The addition seems to find its origin in the Second
Report of the Group of Experts. See GATT, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, BISD, 9
Supp. 194, 198 (1961), where the Group stated the following:
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Group wished to stress that a third country, in
order to justify a request to an importing country to impose measures against another coun-
try, should produce evidence that the dumping engaged in by the other country was causing
material injury to its domestic industry and not only to the exports of the industry of that
third country.
46. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d) (1988).
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Special rule for certain multinational corporations
Whenever... the administering authority determines that -
(1) merchandise exported to the United States is being produced in
facilities which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a per-
son, firm, or corporation which also owns or controls, directly or indi-
rectly, other facilities for the production of such or similar merchandise
which are located in another country or countries;
(2) the sales of such or similar merchandise by the company con-
cerned in the home market of the exporting country are nonexistent or
inadequate as a basis for comparison with the sales of the merchandise to
the United States; and
(3) the foreign market value of such or similar merchandise pro-
duced in one or more of the facilities outside the country of exportation
is higher than the foreign market value of such or similar merchandise
produced in the facilities located in the country of exportation, it shall
determine the foreign market value of such merchandise by reference to
the foreign market value at which such or similar merchandise is sold in
substantial quantities by one or more facilities outside the country of
exportation. The administering authority, in making any determination
under this paragraph, shall make adjustments for the difference between
the costs of production (including taxes, labor, materials, and overhead)
of such or similar merchandise produced in facilities outside the country
of exportation and costs of production of such or similar merchandise
produced in the facilities in the country of exportation, if such differ-
ences are demonstrated to its satisfaction . .. 47
It has been reported48 that this provision was the result of a grievance
by the U.S. company Westinghouse that the Swiss firm Brown Boveri
dumped electrical equipment into the U.S. from its Swiss plant. The
Swiss plant had negligible home market sales and was allegedly being
cross-subsidized by a West German plant.
The report of the Senate Finance Committee49 sheds further light
both on the rationale behind the provision50 and on the necessity of its
adoption. The explanation of the Committee for the provision's adop-
47. Id.
48. R. DALE, ANTI-DUMPING LAW IN A LIBERAL TRADE ORDER 91 (1980).
49. S. REP. No. 1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
50. The report explains:
The Antidumping Act of 1921, in its present form, cannot be applied to discriminatory
pricing by a multinational corporation which sells products made in a plant in one foreign
country at low prices to the United States, while the same company or its subsidiary in
another foreign country subsidizes those low-priced sales with high-priced sales of the same
product to customers in its own market. The factory in the country producing for export
(country A) may make insignificant or no sales in its home market. On the other hand, the
factories in countries which sell at higher prices (countries B and C) may be primarily en-
gaged in selling to their home market, and the profitability of the overall operation may be
largely derived from the home market sales. In such a case, the low-priced export sales are
effectively being supported by the higher-priced sales of the affiliated factories in the home
market, which is often highly protected from outside competition. This practice is a form of
price discrimination which could severely injure domestic producers.
Id. at 174.
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tion is reproduced verbatim below because it exposes that the provi-
sion was adopted on the basis of certain aspects unique to the US.
antidumping law of 1974:
"Foreign market value" is measured by one of two alternative criteria:
The first and primary criterion is "the price ... at which such or
similar merchandise is sold... in the principal markets of the country
from which exported... for home consumption.. . ." However, in the
situation described above [see supra note 50], there are little or no home
market sales being made.
The second criterion covers situations where there are no (or insuffi-
cient) home market sales, as is the case in the situation described above.
In that situation, Section 205 of the Act looks to "the price at which
[such or similar merchandise is] sold for exportation to countries other
than the United States." ... However, as indicated in the situation dis-
cussed above [see supra note 50], all exports of the merchandise pro-
duced in the factory in country A can be sold at uniformly low prices.
The low-priced sales to U.S. customers are supported, not by higher-
priced sales from the country A plant, but by higher-priced sales of the
same products manufactured in the plants of the company which are
located in other countries, B or C .... Thus under the second statutory
criterion for ascertaining "foreign market value," an illusion of no
dumping is produced by comparison of the multinational corporations'
prices on exports to the United States with the low prices on its exports
to other foreign countries. Nor can the Antidumping Act be applied
effectively to a corporation's multinational operations through the use of
"constructed value".... Under the provisions of Section 202, the U.S.
price can be compared to "constructed" home market value only "in the
absence of" foreign market value. Since the conglomerate exports its
country A production to other foreign countries, as well as to the United
States, technically there is a "foreign market value." 51
It is clear from the above extract from the legislative history that the
special MNC provision was adopted because, under the 1974 Trade
Act, the Treasury Department could construct home market value
only "in the absence of home market or export sales."' 52 As there had
normally been third country export sales, the administering authority
was obligated under the law to use such sales (instead of constructed
value) even though there was a likelihood that such third country ex-
port sales had also been "dumped."
While strong arguments can therefore be made that the MNC pro-
vision had become superfluous by 1979, as of the present day it still
allows the Commerce Department under certain circumstances to use
as normal value for merchandise produced in and exported from coun-
try X the price of the similar product sold in country Y by a related
51. Id. at 174-75.
52. The 1979 Trade Agreements Act abolished this statutory preference of third country
exports over constructed value.
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company. If we fill in, for example, Malaysia for country X and Ger-
many for country Y, it does not require much imagination to realize
that there is a likelihood of finding gigantic dumping margins depend-
ing on the extent to which allowances will be made for direct (and
indirect?) cost differences. Rather, the situation which the MNC pro-
vision addresses is not diversion stricto sensu because there has never
been a finding of injurious dumping. Thus, there is nothing to divert
from. The provision could perhaps be qualified as a diversion-preven-
tion instrument in that it allows the Commerce Department to take
into account potential diversion in advance.
The Commerce Department requires petitioners to present ade-
quate intelligence with respect to the applicability of the MNC provi-
sion. In particular, petitioners must demonstrate that there is "a basis
for believing" that the following criteria exist:
(1) Merchandise exported to the United States is being pro-
duced in facilities which are owned or controlled, directly or indi-
rectly, by a person, firm or corporation which also owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, other facilities for the production
of such or similar merchandise which are located in another
country or countries;
(2) the sales of such or similar merchandise by the company
concerned in the home market of the exporting country are non-
existent or inadequate as a basis for comparison with the sales of
the merchandise to the United States;
(3) the FMV of such or similar merchandise produced in one
or more of the facilities outside the country of exportation is
higher than the foreign market value of such or similar merchan-
dise produced in the facilities located in the country of
exportation;
(4) any observed differences in FMV are not solely attributa-
ble to physical differences in merchandise; and
(5) any observed differences in value between the FMV of
products produced outside the country of exportation and the
FMV of products produced in the country of exportation are not
solely attributable to differences in costs of production, pursuant
to the final paragraph of the MNC provision.
If the Commerce Department finds that petitioners have presented
sufficient evidence on these points and during the subsequent investi-
gation has verified that all five conditions have been fulfilled, it calcu-
lates the FMV by reference to the FMV of similar merchandise
produced by the related company located outside the country of ex-
portation. In making this calculation, the Department will adjust for
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differences between costs of production incurred in the country of ex-
portation and the country where the related company is located.
An examination of relevant case law reveals that the Commerce
Department has contemplated applying the MNC provision in only a
handful of cases since 197453 and in only two instances has it actually
invoked the rule.54
The Commerce Department employed the MNC rule for the first
time in Steel Wire Nails from Korea 55 with regard to a Korean nail
producer, Korea Nippon Seisen, and sought to obtain the relevant in-
formation from the producer's Japanese parent, Nippon Seisen. Nip-
pon Seisen refused to cooperate and so the authorities used the trigger
prices for steel wire nails (as an application of the best information
available rule) and made no adjustments to reflect differences in the
cost of production between Japan and Korea. With respect to all re-
maining firms investigated, constructed values were used. The dump-
ing margin imputed to Korea Nippon Seisen (26 percent) was
substantially higher than the margins (ranging from zero to 13 per-
cent) attributed to those companies where constructed values were
used.
In Business Telephone Systems from Taiwan,56 the Commerce De-
partment invoked the MNC provision with respect to goods produced
by one respondent, Taiwan Nitsuko, and computed Taiwan Nitsuko's
dumping margin on the basis of a comparison of FMV of merchandise
produced and sold in Japan by Nitsuko Japan with the U.S price of
merchandise produced by Taiwan Nitsuko and sold in the U.S. (as an
application of the best information available rule). Interestingly, all
other respondents, with respect to whom the MNC provision was not
applied, were found to have weighted average dumping margins of
zero. In contrast, the dumping margin of Taiwan Nitsuko was calcu-
lated to be 130 percent.
In Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from Greece 57 and Ball Bear-
53. Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea, 47 Fed. Reg. 27,392 (1982) (final); Color Television
Receivers from Taiwan, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,706 (1988) (final); Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from
Greece, 54 Fed. Reg. 8,771 (1989) (final); Ball Bearings and Parts thereof from Singapore, 54
Fed. Reg. 19,112 (1989) (final); Ball Bearings and Parts thereof from Thailand, 54 Fed. Reg.
19,117 (1989) (final); Industrial Belts and Components and Parts thereof from Singapore, 54 Fed.
Reg. 25,315 (1989) (final); Certain Small Business Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof
from Taiwan, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,987 (1989) (preliminary).
54. See Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea, supra note 53; Certain Small Business Tele-
phone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Taiwan, supra note 53.
55. See supra note 53.
56. 54 Fed. Reg. 42,543 (1989) (final).
57. See Electrolytic Manganese Dioxide from Greece, supra note 53, at 8,772.
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ings from Thailand,58 the Commerce Department did not apply the
MNC rule because the petitioners failed to satisfy the second criterion
as home market sales in fact did provide an adequate basis for compar-
ison. The U.S. authorities also declined to apply the MNC rule in
instances where the third criterion was not satisfied. In these cases,
the FMV of merchandise produced in a facility outside the country of
exportation was not higher than the FMV of merchandise produced in
the export country;5 9 or the merchandise produced in the two coun-
tries was not similar enough to provide a basis for comparison. 6°
It is worth mentioning that the U.S. provision represents a major
departure from the existing Anti-Dumping Code and, indeed, from
GATT article VI. GATT article VI and the Code currently provide
that when there are no sales in the ordinary course of trade in the
domestic market of the exporting country, the normal value shall be
the comparable price of the products concerned when exported to a
third country or the costs of production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable addition for selling costs and profit. Neither the Code nor
GATT article VI would therefore seem to allow the use of a price in a
country other than that in which the merchandise was produced and/
or from which it was exported for the establishment of normal value.
B. Scope Determinations: Inclusion of Newly-Developed or Altered
Products, Subassemblies, Parts and Components Within the
Scope of an Antidumping Duty Order on a
(finished) Product
In the United States antidumping duties are imposed with respect
to a "class or kind of merchandise." It may not always be clear either
in the course of an investigation or thereafter whether certain products
fall within such class. In the early eighties this problem came up a
number of times with respect to newly developed products. In 1984-85
the same question arose with respect to subassemblies, parts and com-
ponents. Administrative determinations of the Commerce Department
and the jurisprudence of the Court of International Trade have estab-
lished a certain framework for so-called scope determinations which
formed the basis for the circumvention provisions later adopted. It is
therefore relevant to review such case law.
58. See Ball Bearings and Parts thereof from Singapore, supra note 53.
59. See Color Television Receivers from Taiwan, supra note 53; Ball Bearings and Parts
thereof from Thailand, supra note 53, at 18,998 (Appendix B); Ball Bearings and Parts thereof
from Singapore, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,339 (1988).
60. See Industrial Belts and Components thereof from Singapore, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,489
(1989).
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In Royal Business Machines,61 the question arose whether a certain
typewriter was included in the scope of an antidumping duty order on
Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan.62 On this point there ap-
peared to be a conflict between the Customs Service and the Com-
merce Department. The Customs Service was of the opinion that the
typewriter concerned was not portable and therefore should not be
included. Commerce, on the other hand, felt that it should be in-
cluded. 63 The Court of International Trade decided on this clash-of-
powers question as follows:64
The Court distinguishes between the authority of the Customs Service to
classify according to tariff classifications.., and the power of the agen-
cies administering the antidumping law to determine a class or kind of
merchandise. The determinations under the antidumping law may prop-
erly result in the creation of classes which do not correspond to classifi-
cations found in the tariff schedules or may define or modify a known
classification in a manner not contemplated or desired by the Customs
Service. Within the context of an antidumping proceeding the adminis-
tering agency, at the proper time, can define the class in its terms.65
It was this decision that opened the Pandora's box of scope
findings.
The next case was Diversified Products Corporation 66 in which an
importer contested the inclusion of double-gear hub drive speedome-
ters within the scope of an antidumping duty order on Bicycle Speed-
ometers from Japan, on the ground that the former were mainly used
on exercise machines while the latter were mainly used on bicycles. 67
The Court of International Trade confirmed its holding in Royal Busi-
ness Machines and then went on to approve the test used by Com-
merce to determine whether the double-gear hub drive speedometers
which had not yet been developed at the time of the original an-
61. Royal Business Mach. v. United States, 507 F.Supp. 1007, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1445 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1980), affid 669 F.2d 692, 3 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1321 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
62. Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, 45 Fed. Reg. 18,416 (1980) (final); 45 Fed.
Reg. 30,618 (1980) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 353, 1989) (antidumping duty order).
63. Diversified Prod. Corp. v. United States, 572 F.Supp. 883, 887, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1263,
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
64. Royal Business Mach., 507 F.Supp. at 1014 n.18, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1451 n.18.
65. Id. In a later case involving the same portable electric typewriters, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade upheld a finding by the Commerce Department that portable electric typewriters
incorporating calculators were within the scope of the 1980 antidumping duty order but re-
manded a Commerce finding that portable electric typewriters with text memories were not.
Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 698 F.Supp. 240, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2021 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988). See also Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 706 F.Supp. 908, 11 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1077
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
66. 572 F.Supp. 883, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1263 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
67. Bicycle Speedometers from Japan, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,978 (1982) (final scope clarification).
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tidumping proceeding in 1972 should be included within the scope of
the order. This five-prong test consisted of the following elements:
the general physical characteristics of the merchandise;
the expectations of the ultimate purchasers;
the channels of trade in which the merchandise moves;
the ultimate use of the merchandise; and
differences in cost between the two products.
68
The Court agreed with Commerce that application of this test justified
inclusion of the double-gear hub drive speedometers.
69
Finally, in Kyowa Gas Chemical Industry70 the applicant chal-
lenged the finding by Commerce that Kyowaglass-XA, a newly in-
vented product, was within the scope of the antidumping
determination on Acrylic Sheet from Japan.71 Commerce had not ap-
plied the five-prong test in this case because it was of the opinion that
this test was necessary only if the product description was vague. The
Court disagreed: Commerce ought to apply the test for all scope
determinations.
Since 1984, a slightly different test has been applied for determin-
ing the appropriateness of including subassemblies and parts and com-
ponents within the scope of an investigation and/or an antidumping
duty order on the finished product 72 in cases where there was a likeli-
68. The Court noted that Commerce had found that the cost difference between the two
types of speedometers was 11 cents out of a total price of $4.50 per unit (or 2.44 percent cost
difference). Diversified Prod. Corp., 572 F.Supp. at 889, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1269.
69. The case should be distinguished from Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 787 F.2d
565, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2071 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in which the Court of Appeals reversed a decision
by the Court of International Trade, Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 604 F.Supp. 1234, 6
I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1814 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), concerning a challenge to Commerce's determina-
tion that shunt reactors were included within the scope of an antidumping determination on
Large Power Transformers from France, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,268 (1982) (final results of administra-
tive review of antidumping finding). The Court of Appeals held that Commerce in a section 751
review of an antidumping determination of the Treasury Department is limited by the scope of
the underlying finding. While Commerce had the power to determine whether an unclassified
article is within the scope of an original Treasury antidumping finding, it could not change the
scope of an underlying determination in which Treasury specifically included the article within
the scope of the determination.
70. Kyowa Gas Chem. Ind. v. United States, 582 F.Supp. 887, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2131 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984).
71. Acrylic Sheet from Japan, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,490 (1983) (final results of administrative
review).
72. From a legal point of view, a distinction should be made between scope determinations
on the one hand and cases in which either the U.S. industry brings a complaint against both the
finished products and subassemblies and/or parts or the Commerce Department decides to in-
clude certain subassemblies and/or parts during the proceeding on the other hand. However, the
distinction may sometimes become blurred in actual practice. A complaining industry is free to
determine the scope of its complaint and there would not seem to be anything objectionable
against a domestic industry alleging that both a finished product and its subassemblies (or parts)
are dumped with injurious consequences. However, in the view of these authors, the domestic
industry must also produce the subassemblies or parts, and the investigating authorities must
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hood of diversion of the antidumping duty order on the finished prod-
uct through imports of subassemblies, parts and components. 73
In Kokusai Electric 74 the plaintiff challenged both Commerce and
ITC determinations including related subassemblies within the scope
of an antidumping duty order on Cell Site Transceivers and Related
Subassemblies from Japan,75 because, in its opinion, the petition had
not alleged dumping and resulting injury by reason of imports of sub-
assemblies and, in fact, subassemblies had not been exported during
the investigation period. The case was somewhat peculiar because the
plaintiff had never raised the issue of inclusion before the Department
of Commerce and therefore the Court understandably would not per-
mit the plaintiff to raise the issue after Commerce closed the investiga-
determine that the subassemblies and/or parts are also dumped and causing injury to the domes-
tic industry producing the parts. This is, however, not always the case in the practice of the
Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission (nor in the practice of their
Canadian equivalents, see infra notes 180-91 and accompanying text). It would seem that cases
were brought against finished products and (certain) subassemblies in at least the following: Cell
Site Receivers from Japan, 50 Fed. Reg. 307 (1985) (antidumping duty order); Cellular Mobile
Telephones and Subassemblies thereof from Japan [hereinafter CMTs], 50 Fed. Reg. 12,599
(1985) (preliminary); 50 Fed. Reg. 45,447 (1985) (final); Erasable Programmable Read Only
Memories (EPROMs) from Japan, 51 Fed. Reg. 9,087 (1986) (preliminary); 51 Fed. Reg. 39,680
(1986) (final); High Power Microwave Amplifiers and Components thereof from Japan, 51 Fed.
Reg. 43,402 (1986) (final); Color Televisions Receivers from Korea, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,500 (1987)
(final); Tapered Roller Bearings and Parts thereof from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 9,905 (1987) (pre-
liminary); 52 Fed. Reg. 37,352 (1987) (final); Digital Readout Systems and Subassemblies thereof
from Japan, 53 Fed. Reg. 35,222 (1988) (preliminary); 53 Fed. Reg. 47,844 (1988); Certain Small
Business Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 31,978 (1989)
(preliminary); 54 Fed. Reg. 42,541 (1989) (final); Industrial Belts and Components and Parts
thereof from Korea, 54 Fed. Reg. 5,116 (1989) (preliminary); 54 Fed. Reg. 15,487 (1989) (final);
3.5 inch Microdisks and Coated Media thereof from Japan, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,045 (1988) (prelimi-
nary); 54 Fed. Reg. 6,433 (1989) (final); Tapered Roller Bearings Four Inches or Less in Outside
Diameter and Certain Components thereof from Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 12,938 (1989) (final); Anti-
friction Bearings and Parts thereof from West Germany, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,353 (1988) (prelimi-
nary); 54 Fed. Reg. 18,992 (1989) (final); Drafting Machines and Parts thereof from Japan, 54
Fed. Reg. 35,363 (1989) (preliminary); 54 Fed. Reg. 46,961 (1989) (final); Certain Residential
Door Locks and Parts thereof from Taiwan, 54 Fed. Reg. 41,318 (1989) (preliminary). But in
cases where the proceeding involved a variety of countries, e.g., in Ball Bearings and Industrial
Belts, only an example has been given.
See, e.g., Kaplan & Varga, Recent Developments in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Area, in U.S. IMPORT RELIEF LAWS: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAW AND POLICY (1985);
Bello & Holmer, The Scope of "Class or Kind of Merchandise" in Antidumping and Counter-
vailing Duty Cases, in THE ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS: KEY LEGAL
AND POLICY ISSUES 175 (1987); E. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 40-41 (1987).
73. See, e.g., Steel Jacks from Canada, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,577 (1985) (final); Cellular Mobile
Telephones and Subassemblies thereof from Japan, supra note 72; Erasable Programmable Road
Only Memories (EPROMs) from Japan, supra note 72; Color Televisions Receivers from Korea,
supra note 72.
74. Kokusai Elec. Co. v. United States, 632 F.Supp. 23, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2172 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1986).
75. Cell Site Transceivers and Related Subassemblies from Japan, 49 Fed. Reg. 3,100 (1984)
(initiation); 49 Fed. Reg. 24,155 (1984) (preliminary); 49 Fed. Reg. 43,080 (1984) (final); 50 Fed.
Reg. 307 (1985) (antidumping duty order), USITC Pub. 1618, Inv. No. 731-TA-163 (Dec. 1984).
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tion. The Court therefore limited its analysis to review of Commerce's
record and held in relevant part that:
[t]he allegations in the petition were sufficient and included subassem-
blies. Even if the petition were inadequate under the circumstances of
this case Commerce had the power to self-initiate an investigation into
related subassemblies .... The final determination of Commerce included
subassemblies as the same class or kind of merchandise as cell site trans-
ceivers .... The record amply supports a determination of sales at less
than fair value with respect to subassemblies since they were treated as
one class or kind of merchandise throughout the investigation. 76
In Cellular Mobile Telephones from Japan (CMTs),7 7 Commerce
went into more detail in order to determine whether subassemblies
should be included within the scope of the investigation. 78 The De-
partment first defined subassemblies as being "any completed or par-
tially completed circuit modules, the value of which is equal to or
greater than five dollars, and which are dedicated exclusively for use in
CMT transceivers or control units."' 79 The Department's second step
was to determine that such subassemblies were the same "class or kind
of merchandise" as the completed CMTs based on consideration of the
following five factors:
(1) general physical characteristics;
(2) the expectations of the ultimate customers;
(3) the channels of trade in which the product is sold;
(4) the manner in which the product is advertised and displayed;
and
(5) the ultimate use of the merchandise.80
76. Kokusai, 632 F.Supp. at 28-29, 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2177. The Court also upheld the
ITC determination as the ITC, in its opinion, properly investigated injury to only one domestic
industry, the industry producing cell site transceivers and related subassemblies.
77. See CMTs, supra note 72.
78. It should be noted that in the CMT case, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,447, respondents had argued
that the petition of Motorola was aimed only at CMTs and CMT kits. The Commerce Depart-
ment did not agree with this contention, but added that, anyway, it had the authority to include
discrete subassemblies on the basis of diversion considerations and therefore was not dependent
on what Motorola had alleged.
79. Id. at 45,448. The Department clarified that it used the five dollar benchmark for defin-
ing the scope since this represented a value that is equivalent to a "major" subassembly.
80. Id. The International Trade Commission in its injury analysis uses similar criteria to
determine whether parts and finished products are "like products," to wit:
the necessity for, and the costs of, further processing;
the degree of interchangeability of articles at the different stages of production;
whether the article at an earlier stage of production is dedicated to use in the finished article;
whether there are significant independent uses or markets for the finished and unfinished
articles; and
whether the article at an earlier stage of production embodies or imparts to the finished
article an essential characteristic or function.
See, e.g., E. VERMULST, supra note 72, at 523, and the following cases: Certain Rail Passenger
Cars and Components from Canada, USITC Pub. 1277, Inv. No. 701-TA-182 (Aug. 1982) (pre-
liminary); Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Bar, Cold-formed Stainless Steel Bar and Stainless Steel
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It has been pointed out by one commentator that in the CMTs case
this in practice led to inclusion of components which accounted for
less than 0.5 percent of the value of the completed product.8 1
In CMTs, the Commerce Department took the position that it had
the inherent authority to include subassemblies, parts and compo-
nents-whether or not the petitioner specifically alleged dumping and
resulting injury with respect to imports of subassemblies, parts and
components.82 Commerce's decision to include discrete subassemblies
(as opposed to completely knocked down kits) was upheld by the
Court of International Trade in Mitsubishi Electric Corporation.8 3 The
Court found that it was clear from the record that the petitioner Mo-
torola had "intended" to include discrete subassemblies within the
scope of the investigation and suggested, it would seem, that special
allowance ought to be made for the special character of the CMT
industry:
The ITA has the authority to define and/or clarify what constitutes the
subject merchandise to be investigated as set forth in the petition con-
taining the intent of petitioner expressed in as specific and definite terms,
descriptions, and language as reasonably expected of petitioner, taking
into consideration such factors as the newness of the industry, the lack of
available information due to such infancy, the shroud of secrecy a for-
Wire Rod from Spain, USITC Pub. 1333, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-176-178 (Dec. 1982) (final); Forged
Undercarriage Components from Italy, USITC Pub. 1394, Inv. No. 731-TA-133 (June 1983)
(preliminary); Certain Flat-rolled Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, USITC Pub. 1361, Inv.
No. 731-TA-123 (Mar. 1983) (preliminary); Color Televisions from the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan, USITC Pub. 1514, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-134-135 (Apr. 1984) (final); Oil Country Tubular
Goods from Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Spain, USITC Pub. 1555, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-
191-95, 701-TA-215-217 (July 1984) (preliminary); Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassem-
blies thereof from Japan, USITC Pub. 1786, Inv. No. 731-TA-207 (Dec. 1985) (final); 64K Dy-
namic Random Access Memory Components from Japan, USITC Pub. 1735, Inv. No. 731-TA-
270 (Aug. 1985) (final); Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories from Japan, USITC Pub.
1778, Inv. No. 731-TA-288, (Nov. 1985) (preliminary); Dynamic Random Access Memory
Semiconductors of 256 Kilobits and Above from Japan, USITC Pub. 1803, Inv. No. 73 I-TA-300
(Jan. 1986) (preliminary); Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Japan,
Korea and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2156, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-426-428 (Feb. 1989) (preliminary).
81. R. BIERWAGEN, GATT ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECTIONIST BIAS IN ANTIDUMPING
LAWS 37 (forthcoming 1990).
82. See CMTs, supra note 72, at 45,449. See also Kaplan & Varga, supra note 72, at 89, who
state, "[T]he Department also concluded that, whether or not the petitioner specifically included
subassemblies in its petition, the Department had the inherent authority to establish the parame-
ters of an investigation in order to carry out its mandate to administer the law effectively and in
accordance with its intent."
83. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 700 F.Supp. 538, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2254 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1988), aff'd 898 F.2d 1577, 11 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2521 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In the same
case, the ITC had determined that subassemblies dedicated to the performance of each of the
essential functions of a complete CMT constitute a separate like product. However, the ITC
then applied the products line provision of section 771(4)(D) because "available data on the
condition of these domestic industries exist only at the level of complete CMTs." See Cellular
Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies thereof from Japan, supra note 80. On this point, the
Court held that the ITC had failed to seek reasonably available data concerning subassembly
production and therefore remanded the case to the ITC.
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eign industry might hang over its methods of importation, and the
known tactics of foreign industries attempting to avoid a countervailing
duty order. This scope of investigation may be clarified by the ITA de-
pendent upon such additional factors as petitioner's amendments to the
petition, affirmative or negative in nature. ... and additional information
gathered in an investigation that adds further knowledge and content to
the already scant or inadequate information available on such an infant
industry. This comports with Congress' intent to allow the agency some
discretion in determining such circumstances on a case by case basis.84
In Color Television Receivers from Korea,85 the Commerce Depart-
ment had from the outset included complete and incomplete color tel-
evision receivers within the scope of the order. An incomplete color
television receiver was defined as a color picture tube and a printed
circuit board. Following the issuance of the order, some Korean pro-
ducers apparently began importing the color picture tubes (CPT) and
the printed circuit boards (PCB) in separate shipments for assembly in
the United States. The Department viewed this action as an attempt
to circumvent the antidumping duty order on incomplete color televi-
sion receivers and on October 17, 1986, issued a clarification of the
scope of the order in which it expressly stated that "an incomplete
television receiver would be viewed as such, regardless of the form in
which its components were imported." This meant that even if the
color picture tube and the printed circuit board were imported in dif-
ferent packages, they would still be considered as an incomplete color
television receiver for purposes of the collection of antidumping duties.
Commerce's scope decision was upheld in the Gold Star case where
the Court of International Trade found that separately imported PCBs
and CPTs subsequently assembled into color television receivers were
of the class or kind of merchandise intended to be covered by the an-
tidumping duty order.86 Somewhat ponderously, the court added
84. Mitsubishi Elec. Corp., 700 F.Supp. at 555-56, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 2268 (citations
omitted).
85. See supra note 72.
86. Gold Star Co. v. United States, 692 F.Supp. 1382, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1850 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), afl'd sub nom. Samsung Elec. Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d. 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
In Samsung, Judge Nichols issued a strongly-worded dissent:
The result-oriented court decision may be less favored now than a few years ago, but doubt-
less never will become extinct. It is a temptation to which all of us must occasionally yield
unless someone obnoxiously takes on himself the role of little boy in the "emperor has no
clothes" fable .... There can be no doubt that the Koreans import CPTs and PCBs in entries
separate from other components and from each other to distance them, legally, from the
complete and incomplete television receivers which are the subjects of the proceeding, but
there is no suggestion that this is evasion rather than avoidance of dumping duty. Until now
there has been no challenge to the proposition that an importer enjoys the privilege of fash-
ioning and packaging his goods for import in the form and manner that, absent deception,
will obtain for him the most favorable tariff treatment .... It was doubtless a mistake to omit
CPTs and PCBs, imported separately, from the 1983 proceeding respecting Korean color
televisions. It was, mistake or not, a decision businessmen must have relied on in making
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that:
[pilaintiffs cannot avoid the imposition of antidumping duties merely by
bifurcating their shipments. The Court will not allow such a transgres-
sion upon the antidumping laws of this country. The object of the
dumping laws is to protect domestic producers against imported mer-
chandise which "is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at
less than its fair value. .. ." The present merchandise is sold on the U.S.
market not as a PCB nor as a CPT, but as a color television receiver; the
object of the original antidumping duty order. If the Court were to al-
low separate importations of PCBs and CPTs (subsequently assembled
together) to escape the purview of the CTV order, the domestic industry
would continue to suffer the injurious consequences of dumped goods.8 7
It should be noted that in Steel Wheels from Brazil,88 the Commerce
Department announced that it would no longer include parts and
components within the scope of an antidumping duty order on the
finished product on the basis of diversion concerns. The Department
defined the scope of the investigation as including "steel wheels, as-
sembled or unassembled, consisting of both a disc and a rim"8 9 and
rescinded its preliminary determination in which it had included "rims
or discs, whether imported separately or together." 9° The Department
found that discs had not been imported during the investigation pe-
riod, that there was a separate market for rims,91 and that petitioners'
"primary concern" for requesting inclusion of rims was diversion.
The Department then held that:
[i]n past cases where petitioners have raised concerns about circumven-
tion of any resulting order, the Department has specifically included
parts in the scope of the investigation because of uncertainty as to the
authority of the Department to include parts subsequent to the publica-
tion of an order where parts are imported to circumvent the order....
Now, however, Section 781 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act... not only clarifies that the Department has such authority but
sets forth the criteria for dealing with this type of circumvention. There-
fore, notwithstanding pre-1988 Act administrative precedents, it is not
necessary to include rims in the scope of the proceeding. 92
business decisions, and Commerce must live with it. It is a worse mistake, especially in light
of the background, to impute to the original authors of the investigation an intent that they
never expressed until 1986, and then in order to correct the mistake they made in 1983.
Result-oriented jurisprudence could not find a worse place in which to raise its head.
87. Gold Star, 692 F.Supp. at 1385, 10 I.T.R.D. (BNA) at 1853 (citations omitted).
88. Steel Wheels from Brazil, 54 Fed. Reg. 21,456 (1989) (final).
89. 54 Fed. Reg. 21,457 (1989) (emphasis added).
90. Id
91. The rims had been purchased by unrelated custom wheel manufacturers who combined
the rims with non-Brazilian discs. Commerce noted that the disc and further processing added
significant value to the customs wheel in which the Brazilian rim was only one component. Id
92. 54 Fed. Reg. 21,457 (1989). In view of the description of the rim market, see id., it seems
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It therefore specifically excluded separately sold rims and discs from
the scope of the investigation.
An interesting and still relevant question is whether Commerce in-
vestigated whether the subassemblies and/or parts were actually
dumped and whether the ITC investigated whether imports of subas-
semblies and/or parts were causing injury to the U.S. industry produc-
ing the parts. Logically, one might assume that this was not the case.
This is because scope rulings (as opposed to cases in which U.S. indus-
try alleged from the beginning that both the finished product and sub-
assemblies and/or parts were dumped with injurious consequences or
in which Commerce decides during the investigation to include subas-
semblies and/or parts)93 chronologically take place at the end of the
proceeding, i.e., at a time when the ITC has already made its definitive
injury determination and when Commerce has already completed its
investigation into dumping.94 One could therefore have argued that
scope rulings were in violation of GATT article VI requiring findings
of dumping and resulting injury. The counter-argument would be that
Commerce's inclusion of subassemblies and/or parts is based on a
finding that the complete product and its subassemblies/parts fall
within the same "class or kind of merchandise" and that the Depart-
ment may use sampling techniques to determine dumping margins.
improbable that Commerce - ceteris paribus - would find that circumvention was likely to
take place in the context of a circumvention investigation.
It should be noted that this does not mean that the Commerce Department has discontinued
its practice of issuing scope rulings. Indeed, in the recent case Television Receivers, Mono-
chrome and Color, from Japan, Preliminary Scope Ruling, 55 Fed. Reg. 9,075 (1990), the Com-
merce Department decided to include liquid crystal display televisions of less than 6 inches
within the scope of the 1971 antidumping duty order on television receivers, monochrome and
color, from Japan. Commerce held that, as such inclusion was clear from the descriptions of the
product concerned in the determinations of the Department itself and the ITC, it was not neces-
sary to apply the five-prong test, discussed supra.
In A-588-802 Scope Review Public Document OADC: 2P (August 1990), the Commerce
Department furthermore refused to exclude 3.5 inch barium ferrite microdisks from the scope of
the antidumping duty order on 3.5 inch microdisks and coated media thereof from Japan on the
ground that such disks did not represent a major technological breakthrough but rather a techni-
cal refinement. In making this determination, Commerce analyzed the general physical charac-
teristics of the merchandise, the expectations of the ultimate customers, the ultimate use of the
merchandise and the channels of trade. It should be noted that a general problem with the scope
ruling is that until recently the grand majority were not published in the Federal Register, but
only in the form of internal Commerce Department memoranda which were communicated to
interested parties. This means that it was practically impossible to gain any insight into how
many scope rulings there actually have been. Commerce Department officials estimate that there
have been a "couple of dozen." The Commerce Department is presently in the process of going
through its files and establishing a list of all scope rulings. This list will then be published in the
Federal Register. Telephone conversations with Dick Moreland and David Mueller, Commerce
Department, Sept. 13, 1990.
93. See cases cited in note 72, supra.
94. On the other hand, in the U.S. system, antidumping duties are levied only on the basis of
the results obtained in the course of an annual review. Presumably, in the course of such reviews,
margins are then calculated on shipments of parts and components.
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This logic, in turn, could be rebutted on the basis that "class or kind of
merchandise" is not a GATT term and that GATT's "like product"
test presumably would not allow findings that discrete subassemblies
and parts are products "like" the finished product. 95
C. Monitoring96
U.S. law97 explicitly authorizes the Commerce Department to self-
initiate antidumping proceedings whenever it determines from the in-
formation available to it that a formal investigation is warranted into
the question whether the elements necessary for the imposition of an
antidumping duty exist.98 The Trade and Tariff Act of 198499 and the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 essentially strength-
ened this authority by providing for certain forms of monitoring. Ob-
viously, such monitoring enables the Commerce Department to gather
evidence that might later be used to justify self-initiation.
Both forms of monitoring are linked to the existence of antidump-
ing duty orders in effect with respect to related products and seem
designed simultaneously to relieve U.S. industry from the burden of
having to file additional complaints 00 and to provide speedy and effec-
95. This also has repercussions for the GAIT-legality of the 1988 U.S. anti-circumvention
provisions. See infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.
96. Compare article 8(4) of the 1979 Anti-Dumping Code, supra note 3, at 180-81, and, in
particular, the 1981 Understanding on Article 8(4) of the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade adopted on October 30, 1981, in
GAIT, BISD, 28 Supp. 52 (1982), in which the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices agreed
that:
such [special monitoring] schemes are not envisioned by Article VI of the GAT or the
Agreement and it is of the view that they give cause for concern in that they could be used in
a manner contrary to the spirit of the Agreement. The Committee agreed that such schemes
shall not be used as a substitute for initiating and carrying out antidumping investigations in
full conformity with all provisions of the Agreement. The Committee further agreed that, as
monitoring schemes may have the effect of burdening and distorting trade, it is advisable
that the effects of such monitoring schemes on international trade continue to be examined
with, inter alia, a view to assessing the need for strengthening international discipline in this
area.
97. Section 732(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)
(1988)).
98. This authority has been used sparingly. See E. VERMULST, supra note 72, at 41.
99. For a discussion of the 1984 Act, see Bello & Holmer, The Trade and TariffAct of 1984:
PrincipalAntidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions, 19 INT'L LAW. 639 (1985); Palmeter,
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: From the Customs Treatment of Manhole Covers to the Return
of Goods from Outer Space, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COMM. 487 (1984).
100. This is clear, for example, from the House Report on the 1984 provision which provides
in relevant part:
The Committee's concern over more effective monitoring of persistent injurious dumping
allegations arises because several domestic producers have brought successful cases only to
find that the source of dumped imports has shifted to additional supplier countries. The
domestic producers do not always have the resources to pursue action against every foreign
producer engaging in dumping activities, and the U.S. Government should share more of
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tive relief in appropriate cases. 10 1 But query whether the rather one-
sided concern about the burdens (lack of "resources") of the domestic
industry in filing a complaint is justified in view of the facts that the
majority of antidumping cases are filed by resourceful industrial sec-
tors such as the steel industry, the chemical industry and the con-
sumer electronics industry, and that the burden of defending an
antidumping case tends to be much heavier for foreign producers than
the burden for domestic producers of filing a petition.10 2
1. Monitoring in Cases of Persistent Injurious Dumping
Section 609 of the 1984 Act authorized Commerce to monitor im-
ports for up to one year if:
(1) there are at least two antidumping duty orders in effect with
regard to the "class or kind of merchandise;"
(2) Commerce determines that there is a reasonable basis to be-
lieve that an "extraordinary pattern of persistent injurious dump-
ing" exists from one or more additional countries; and
(3) Commerce determines that imports from these additional
countries are causing a "serious commercial problem" for the
U.S. industry producing the "class or kind of merchandise."' 0 3
Since 1984, Commerce has received four requests for monitoring
under this provision - two from Zenith Electronics Corporation, one
from the U.S. Copper & Brass Fabricators Council'04 and one from
the Torrington Company'0 5 - only one of which it has found (in part)
meritorious'°6: Zenith's request to monitor exports of color televi-
the burden of gathering information and initiating cases where appropriate if an industry
has already demonstrated it has been injured from foreign dumping.
H. REP. No. 725, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1984).
101. See also Garfinkel & Shea, Some Recent Developments in the Administration of the An-
tidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, in TRADE LAW AND POLICY INsTrrTE 9, 27 (1989),
where the authors state that "[t]he impetus behind this provision is clear - Congress was tired
of watching U.S. industries obtain relief from unfairly traded imports only to face unfair compe-
tition from another country not covered by the antidumping order."
102. Compare Options to Improve the Trade Remedy Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Trade of the House Ways & Means Committee, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 565 (1983) (statement
of Gary N. Horlick, Dept. Asst. Sec'y of Comm. for Import Admin.); J. BHAGWATI, PROTEC-
TIONISM 48 (1989), who notes that "the absence of penalties for frivolous complaints means that
a plaintiff often incurs only small costs, whereas a defendant (who has much to lose) often must
hire the most expensive lawyers."
103. Section 732(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)
(Supp. 1 1989).
104. For an extensive description, see Garfinkel & Shea, supra note 101.
105. This request was dated April 20, 1990, and it concerns ball bearings and parts thereof
from Austria, Spain, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and China. No decision on the request had been made as of
May 11, 1990.
106. The request of the U.S. Copper & Brass Fabricators Council was rejected by Commerce
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sions, color picture tubes and components from China, Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand,107 re-
sulted in establishment of a monitoring program with respect to ex-
ports from Mexico' 08 and Malaysia. This was based on findings that
antidumping duty orders were in effect with regard to color televisions
from Korea and Taiwan and color picture tubes from Canada, Japan,
Korea and Singapore; imports from Mexico and Malaysia had signifi-
cantly increased since 1983; exports from Japan had significantly de-
creased; and a number of Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese companies
had subsidiaries in either Malaysia or Mexico.
2. Downstream Product Monitoring
The 1988 Act provides authority for monitoring imported finished
products (the downstream product) which contain a component (the
upstream product) that was found to have been dumped in the previ-
ous five years.1 9 The upstream product must - due to its inherent
characteristics - be routinely used as a major part of the downstream
product"0 and the dumping margin found with respect to the up-
stream product must have been at least fifteen percent.
The U.S. industry producing the upstream product or the down-
stream product may request the Commerce Department to monitor if
it can show that it has reason to believe that imports of the down-
stream product will increase. The Commerce Department must deter-
mine within fourteen days of receipt of such request whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that imports of the downstream product will in-
crease as an indirect result of any diversion with respect to the compo-
nent. The Commerce Department must examine the request on the
basis of the following criteria:
because it did not find an "extraordinary pattern of injurious dumping;" imports from the addi-
tional countries (Argentina, Hungary, Mexico, Switzerland, U.K. and Yugoslavia) had not sig-
nificantly increased since the 1987 imposition of antidumping duties on Brazil, Canada, France,
FRG, Italy and Korea; and there was no evidence of related companies operating in and export-
ing from the additional countries.
See Garfinkel and Shea, supra note 101.
107. Zenith's second request concerning color television receivers, complete or incomplete,
and assemblies therefor, including color picture tubes, from China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thai-
land and the Philippines, was filed on February 28, 1990. No decision had been made as of May
11, 1990.
108. Presumably also covering Mexican exports of petitioner Zenithl
109. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1320, (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1677i
(Supp. 1 1989)).
110. See H. REp. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 598 (1988). See also Antidumping and
Countervailing Duties, Interim Final Rule, 55 Fed. Reg. 9,046, 9,048 (Int'l Trade Admin., Dept.
of Comm. 1990) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. §§ 353, 355 (1990)).
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the value of the component in relation to the value of the fin-
ished product;
the extent to which the component has been substantially
transformed as a result of its incorporation into the finished prod-
uct; and
the relationship between the producers of the component and
the producers of the downstream product.
If Commerce determines that the monitoring is warranted, it will re-
quest the International Trade Commission to monitor trade in the
downstream product and issue quarterly reports. It could then decide
to initiate an antidumping proceeding, presumably if the information
provided by the ITC were to indicate sufficient evidence of dumping
and resulting injury. Thus far, this provision has not been used.
D. The 1988 Circumvention Provision
The United States in 1988 adopted a circumvention provision l"'
which covers the following situations:
(1) importation of parts and components into the United
States for assembly into a product of the same class or kind of
merchandise as that which is subject to an antidumping duty or-
der where the difference between the value of the finished product
and the value of the exporting country parts is "small";
(2) assembly or completion of parts and components in a
third country into a product of the same class or kind of mer-
chandise as the product subject to an antidumping duty order 12
in the United States where the difference between the value of the
finished product and the value of the exporting country parts is
",small";' 13
(3) importation of products with minor alterations compared
to the product subject to an antidumping duty order in the
11. The circumvention provisions are laid down in Section 1321 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1677j
(Supp. 11989)). For analysis, see Heilferty, Moreland & Shorin, Current Issues in the Conduct of
Inquiries into the Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 1990 TRADE
LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE 25. See also Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, Interim
Final Rule, supra note 110.
112. In fact, it would seem that the provision also covers the scenario where the part or
component is the subject of an antidumping duty order or finding and such part or component is
insufficiently processed in the third country before being exported to the United States. In such a
case the difference between the value of the original component and the processed component
presumably would have to be "small." It is therefore a third country variant on both the first
and the third situation.
113. Cameron & Crawford, An Overview of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Amendments: A New Protectionism, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 471, 476 (1989), report that the
probable targets of this provision were the foreign television and semiconductor industries.
1150 [V/ol. 11:1119
Anti-Diversion Rules
United States;' 14 and
(4) importation of newly developed products with the same
basic characteristics as those subject to an antidumping duty
order. 115
The Commerce Department must ascertain in specific cases whether
any of these situations arises and, if so, whether it constitutes
circumvention. 16
Apparently, both the Senate and the House deliberately abstained
from delineating the term "small."' 117 The pertinent section in the
Senate Report on the Act states:
The Committee has not attempted to develop a precise meaning for the
term "small" as used in these sections, principally in recognition that
different cases present different factual situations. The Committee does
not, however, intend that the term "small" be interpreted as insignifi-
cant. While these subsections grant the Commerce Department substan-
tial discretion in interpreting these terms, and invoking these measures,
so as to allow it the flexibility to apply the provisions in an appropriate
manner, the Committee expects the Commerce Department to use this
authority to the fullest extent possible to combat diversion and circum-
vention of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 81 8
Practical experience with the circumvention provisions in the U.S.
is still limited. In Certain Internal-combustion, Industrial Forklift
Trucks from Japan,' 9 the Commerce Department considered four
factors - the first three of which were explicitly provided for in the
Act - to determine whether assembly operations in the United States
(the first situation) were made under circumstances such as to consti-
tute circumvention:
114. Cameron & Crawford report that the amendment resulted from the Portable Electric
Typewitersfrom Japan proceeding, discussed in notes 61-95, supra, and accompanying text. Id.
at 477.
115. The Conference Report on the 1988 Act provides on this point that "[t]his provision is
intended to clarify and codify current Commerce Department authority, which has been recog-
nized by the courts. It is not intended, nor are any of the provisions in this section intended, to
call into question past authority of the Commerce Department to make scope decisions." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong, 2nd Sess. 601 (1988).
116. For general discussions of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, including
the diversion provisions, see Horlick & Oliver, Antidumping and Countervailing Law Provisions
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 23 J. WORLD TRADE 5-49 (June 1989);
Holmer & Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Saviour or Scourge of the International Trading System? 23
INT'L LAW. 523 (1989); Cameron & Crawford, supra note 113.
117. According to Horlick & Oliver, supra note 116, at 26, the Senate Finance Committee
explicitly rejected the EC sixty/forty percent value-of-parts test, which is discussed in more de-
tail in notes 137-62 and accompanying text, infra.
118. S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 100 (1987).
119. 54 Fed. Reg. 50,260 (1989) (preliminary); 55 Fed. Reg. 6,028 (1990) (final). The final
determination is discussed in 7 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 259 (1990).
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(1) the pattern of trade; 20
(2) whether the manufacturer or exporter' 2' was related to
the entity that assembles or completes the merchandise sold in the
U.S.;
(3) whether imports of the parts or components from the
country with respect to which the antidumping duty order or
finding applies had increased and imports of the completed prod-
uct decreased after issuance of that order or finding; and
(4) the nature of the production process in the U.S.122
The Commerce Department determined that:
(1) the patterns of trade for Japanese forklift trucks and fork-
lift trucks produced in the U.S. by the companies under investiga-
tion were similar;
(2) the U.S. assembly operations were related to the Japanese
producers/exporters;
(3) imports of Japanese parts and components had increased
while imports of completed Japanese forklift trucks had de-
creased; and
(4) "respondents' current U.S. operations, their investment in
these facilities, and the expanding nature of their operations rep-
resent the substantial establishment of major U.S. production op-
erations," rather than "completion or assembly operations
established for the purpose of evading the antidumping duty
order."123
The Commerce Department furthermore ruled that the twenty-five to
forty percent difference (plus or minus ten percent) between the value
of forklift trucks completed and sold in the United States and the
value of Japanese components used in the production of such forklift
trucks was not "small" and that, consequently, production processes
carried out under such circumstances did not constitute circumven-
tion. Commerce expressis verbis rejected the view propagated by the
120. Commerce here examined the patterns of trade for the marketing of the Japanese fork-
lift trucks and the forklift trucks produced in the United States by the respondents. Certain
Internal-combustion, Industrial Forklift Trucks from Japan, 55 Fed. Reg. at 6,029 (1990).
121. In this context it should be noted that section 781(a)(2)(B) of the 1988 Act (codified at
19 U.S.C. § 1677j (Supp. 1 1989)) explicitly provides that the relevant query is whether the man-
ufacturer or exporter of the parts or components is related to the assembler of the merchandise
sold in the United States from parts or components produced in the exporting country with
respect to which the antidumping duty order or finding applies.
122. While this fourth factor is not explicitly mentioned in section 781(a)(2) of the Tariff Act
of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (Supp. 1 1989)), Commerce considered it
appropriate to examine the U.S. production process because of clear indications in the legislative
history of the 1988 Act. See 54 Fed. Reg. at 50,261 (1989).
123. 54 Fed. Reg. 50,263 (1989).
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U.S. industry that it compare the value of Japanese parts with the U.S.
value added on the basis that "the anti-circumvention provision is not
a local content law." 124
In Electrical Conductor Aluminum Redraw Rod from Venezuela,
Commerce faced a complaint by the U.S. petitioner that the Venezue-
lan company Sural was circumventing antidumping and counter-
vailing duty orders on electrical conductor aluminum redraw (ECAR)
rod in performing a minor alteration (the third situation) by drawing it
into .250 inch electrical conductor aluminum wire. Commerce closely
tracked the following guidelines in the legislative history for determin-
ing whether circumvention through minor alterations occurs:
In applying this provision, the Commerce Department should apply
practical measurements regarding minor alterations, so that circumven-
tion can be dealt with effectively, even where such alterations to an arti-
cle technically transform it into a differently designated article. The
Commerce Department should consider such criteria as the overall char-
acteristics of the merchandise, the expectations of the ultimate users, the
use of the merchandise, the channels of marketing and the cost of any
modification relative to the total value of the imported product.125
It applied these five conditions as follows to the specifics of the case:
(1) Physical characteristics of the products: Commerce ac-
knowledged that the original investigation concerned only ECAR
rod and that both the TSUSA and HTS would classify the .250
inch wire as a wire product because it is less than .375 inch and in
coils, but pointed out that this distinction was "largely one of
tariff classification." By contrast, the only physical difference be-
tween the two was that the .250 wire had been passed once
through a wire drawing mill. Both were intermediate products
designed to be redrawn into aluminum wire and needed further
processing.
(2) Use of the merchandise: Both .250 wire and rod are used
for the same purpose: further drawing into electrical conductive
strands of various sizes for use in manufacturing cable. Indeed,
Sural had merely transferred the intermediate step (the passing
through the wire drawing mill) from the U.S. to Venezuela.
(3) Expectations of the ultimate consumer: Consumers of both
ECAR rod and .250 wire would normally use the products in the
same way.
(4) Marketing channels: While the wire sales were made to a
124. 55 Fed. Reg. 6,029 (1990).
125. See Electrical Conductor Redraw Rod from Venezuela, 55 Fed. Reg. 3,435 (1990) (pre-
liminary) (quoting S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at 100 (1987))(emphasis added).
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different - but related - party, Commerce noted that there was
hardly any outside demand for the wire and that prior to the an-
tidumping duty order there were no sales at all of .250 wire.
(5) Cost of modification relative to the total value: The De-
partment calculated that the cost of modification (the value added
to ECAR rod through the production of .250 wire) was less than
2.5 percent of the total value of the product.' 26
Based on the above analysis, Commerce preliminarily decided to in-
clude .250 wire within the scope of the antidumping duty order on the
rod. It should be noted that the Department characterized its deter-
mination as a "scope ruling" and - somewhat ambiguously - stated
that "[o]ur determination does not reach any conclusion as to whether
respondents were intentionally seeking to evade or circumvent these
orders." 12 7
E. The 1988 Input Dumping Provision
Section 1318 of the 1988 Act provides that where Commerce has
reasonable grounds to believe that the cost of production of a major
input produced by a party related to the party producing the finished
126. Id.
127. This language seems consistent with the statement in the Conference Report of the 1988
Act, quoted in note 115, supra, that the anti-circumvention legislation - or at least the minor
alterations provision - embodies the authority which the Department has always possessed and
routinely exercised to issue scope rulings as a means of clarifying whether particular merchandise
is covered by the scope of an existing antidumping duty order.
In Preliminary Scope Ruling, Portable Electric Typewriters from Japan, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,107
(1990) (preliminary), Commerce had to decide whether typewriters to which were added LCD,
LED or CRT display and expanded and/or removable text memory (essentially portable word
processors) were excluded from the scope of the 1980 order on portable electric typewriters from
Japan. As the product descriptions in the complaint and in the Commerce and ITC determina-
tions were not dispositive, and as the allegations were that the products in question were later
developed products, Commerce decided to apply the 1988 rules on later developed products. The
Department determined that the storage ability and word processing capabilities of later devel-
oped PETs did not create a different set of expectations for the ultimate purchaser. As they still
retained the primary function found in the 1980 PETs and could still be used as a traditional
typewriter, they had also retained the same ultimate use as the 1980 PETs. Channels of trade
and advertising and display were not dispositive because these characteristics were the same not
only for PETs, PWPs, PCs, but also for other consumer goods. Commerce then essentially in-
cluded each known model if it met the following criteria:
- easily portable, with a handle and/or carrying case, or a similar mechanism to facilitate its
portability;
- electric;
- comprised of a single, integrated unit;
- keyboard embedded in the chassis or frame of the machine;
- built-in printer;
- platen (roller) to accomodate paper;
- only accomodates its own dedicated or captive software.
The Commerce Department also determined that PWPs represented a "significant technological
advance and significant alteration" of the 1980 PETs so that the ITC had to be notified in accord-
ance with Section 781(e) of the 1988 Act.
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product is greater than the transfer price charged for such input, it
may determine the (real) value on the "best evidence available regard-
ing such costs of production"1 28 when such costs are greater than the
arm's length price.
The Conference Report adds two interesting points concerning
Congress' envisaged application of this provision:
In relying on best evidence available, Commerce may use information
developed during the course of a previous antidumping investigation of
the particular material or component with regard to the "foreign market
value." If Commerce uses information from a previous investigation,
however, it must consider whether the information is still reliable, taking
into account the period of time on which the information is based. It is
not the intent of the conferees that foreign market value be based on
constructed value solely for the purpose of using this provision to in-
crease dumping margins. The conferees expect that constructed value
shall be used ...only when a price comparison using home market
prices or third country sales price is inappropriate. Inappropriate situa-
tions could include the situation in which a component that accounts for
a significant proportion of the value of the merchandise subject to inves-
tigation is purchased by a related party at a dumped price.129
Prior to adoption of the provision, Commerce already had the author-
ity to ignore the transfer price if sufficient evidence existed that this
price did not reflect the market price. The Department therefore nor-
mally compared the transfer price with sales prices to unrelated sup-
pliers.' 30 The amendment now requires the Department to compare
the transfer price not only with the arm's length price but also with
the cost of production of the input, and then apply, it would seem, the
higher of the two.
If this reading is correct, the amendment creates a tilt to the disad-
vantage of the foreign respondent: if the arm's length price is higher
than the cost of production, the Department would use such price,
while if the arm's length price is lower than the cost of production, the
Department would use cost. Thus, if the market for the input is buoy-
ant and high profits can be realized, the market price would be used.
If, on the other hand, the market is depressed and the input is sold
below cost, the market price could be ignored. This indirectly enables
Commerce to counter input dumping even if the transfer price is equal
to or higher than the market price (but below cost).
128. The Conference Report of the 1988 Act, supra note 115, at 595, clarifies that such cost
should be fully allocated cost, including overheads, but not profit.
129. See supra note 115, at 595-96.
130. Only if there were no transactions with unrelated suppliers would the Commerce De-
partment compare the transfer price with the cost of production.
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F. The 1988 "Repeat Corporate Offenders" Provision
Section 1323 of the 1988 Act introduces certain special procedures
to deal with repeat corporate offenders operating in short life cycle
product sectors. The amendment consists of several elements.
In the first place, it authorizes domestic industries to petition the
ITC to establish a "product category" consisting of certain short life
cycle merchandise. The term "short life cycle merchandise" is defined
as "[a]ny product that the Commission determines is likely to become
outmoded within four years, by reason of technological advances, after
the product is commercially available." 13' The legislative history elu-
cidates that the amendment is aimed in particular at semiconductors:
The conferees are concerned about the application of the antidumping
law with respect to a number of industries, particularly the high-technol-
ogy sectors, in which product life cycles are relatively short. A product
can be displaced as a result of technological advances by a new genera-
tion of product with superior cost or performance characteristics very
quickly. With the introduction of a new product, sales growth of the
earlier product will slow, and demand will begin to decline, although
some residual sales of the earlier product may continue to be made for
many years. For example, in the case of semiconductors, a life cycle for
a particular kind of semiconductor is often 2 to 3 years. 132
The second element is the introduction of the notion of repeat cor-
porate offenders. The amendment defines repeat corporate offenders
as manufacturers who have been found dumping (with a margin in
excess of fifteen percent) during the eight previous years two or more
times, with a distinction being made between second (two margins
within eight years) and multiple offenders (three or more margins in
eight years). Second and multiple offenders may be subjected to expe-
dited antidumping investigations.
At its face value, the provision seems quite reasonable. Indeed, it
merely provides for a fast track procedure, in which dumping and re-
sulting injury again would have to be found, and it applies only to
limited categories of products and can be used only against corpora-
tions which have been found dumping two or more times in the same
product sector (and which therefore could be said to have built up a
certain amount of expertise in responding). However, as two com-
131. The Conference Report of the 1988 Act, supra note 115, at 606, clarifies that "outmo-
ded" means "a kind or style no longer state-of-the-art." It also specifies that the length of the life
cycle "should not be determined by reference to the entire time period over which a product may
be sold, but should be considered to end at the point at which the emergence on the market of a
new product with superior cost or performance characteristics begins to affect adversely the sales
of the earlier product."
132. See The Conference Report of the 1988 Act, supra note 115, at 606.
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mentators 133 have aptly observed:
[slince unanswered questions commonly are resolved to the detriment of
the responding foreign companies, it is very likely that the real impact of
this provision will be the increased use of the best information available
procedure. This, of course, appears to be the end result desired by the
proponents of the bill. 134
G. The 1988 Third Country Dumping Provision
Section 1317 allows domestic industries to petition the U.S. Trade
Representative to request 35 a third country to start an antidumping
proceeding on the basis that products are dumped in such third coun-
try and are thereby causing injury to the U.S. industry manufacturing
the like product.
IV. THE EC's APPROACH TOWARDS DIVERSION 136
In the EC, different tests are applied for determining the occur-
rence of diversion through production within the EC and production
in third countries. Only with respect to the former does a specific anti-
circumvention provision exist. Other forms of diversion, including
third country diversion, have thus far been dealt with under the ex-
isting rules (rules of origin and customs classification).
A. Production in the EC: Parts Investigations 37
In June 1987, the EC adopted a specific circumvention provision in
the framework of its antidumping law138 by incorporating an extra
procedure for investigation of assembly operations in the EC.139 As of
the moment of writing, seven proceedings concerning assembly opera-
133. See Cameron & Crawford, supra note 113, at 492.
134. Horlick and Oliver, supra note 116, at 24-25, on the other hand, have pointed out that
this may also backfire because the shortened deadlines "means less time for petitioner's counsel
to analyze the exporter's data and point out any tricks being played."
135. The request is the carrot. The stick is that - if the third country were to refuse to
initiate an investigation - USTR must consult with the domestic industry concerned to deter-
mine whether action under any other U.S. law would be appropriate.
136. See also Vermulst & Waer, EC Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments?
(forthcoming 24 J. WORLD TRADE, June 1990).
137. See for more detail, including literature references, Vermulst & Waer, supra note 136.
138. Although the circumvention provision is an integral part of the EC's Antidumping Reg-
ulation, in GATT the EC has justified the adoption on the basis of GATT article XX(d).
139. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1761/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 167) 9 (1987).
The amendment was incorporated in the new Antidumping Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88, 31
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) 1 (1988). See Bellis, Vermulst & Waer, Further Changes in the
EEC Antidumping Regulation: A Codification of Controversial Methodologies, 23 J. WORLD
TRADE, 21-34 (Apr. 1989).
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tions in the EC have been initiated,140 all of them aimed at Japanese
manufacturing operations in the Common Market.
Article 13(10) of the EC's Antidumping Regulation provides that
antidumping duties may also be levied on products assembled within
the EC, provided that three cumulative conditions have been fulfilled:
(1) The producer in the EC must have a relationship 141 or
association 42 with an exporter of the like product subject to
duties; 143
(2) the producer in the EC must have commenced or substan-
tially increased its production after the commencement of an an-
tidumping proceeding; 1" and
(3) more than 6 percent of the value 145 of parts or materials
140. Electronic Typewriters, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 235) 2 (1987) (assembly operations
of Brother, Canon, Matsushita, TEC, Sharp and Silver Seiko); Electronic Scales, 30 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 235) 3 (1987) (assembly operations of TEC Keylard and TEC U.K.); Hydraulic
Excavators, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 285) 4 (1987) (assembly operation of Komatsu);
Photocopiers, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 44) 3 (1988) (assembly operations of Canon, Kon-
ishiroku, Matsushita, Minolta, Ricoh, Sharp and Toshiba); Ball Bearings, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 150) 4 (1988) (assembly operations of Nippon Seiko and NTN Toyo Bearing); Serial
Impact Dot Matrix Printers 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 327) 8 (1988) (assembly operations of
Brother, Citizen, Fujitsu, Juki, Matsushita, NEC, OKI, Seiko Epson, Seikosha, Star Micronics
and TEC); Video Cassette Recorders, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 172) 2 (1989) (assembly opera-
tion of Orion).
141. In Electronic Scales, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 1 (1988), TEC-Keylard was
deemed to be related to TEC because it had substantial capital links and close economic and
commercial relations with TEC Japan. In Plain Paper Photocopiers, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
284) 36, 37 (1988); 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 284) 60, 61 (1988), a fifty percent plus one share
holding was considered sufficient.
142. Although in Electronic Typewriters, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 4, 5 (1988), as-
sembly operations were in one case carried out by an independent company, the Council deter-
mined that this did not preclude application of the parts amendment:
One company, namely Silver Reed International (Europe) Ltd, claimed that it should not be
included in this investigation because the assembly operation was not carried out by Silver
Reed but by Astec Europe Ltd. However, the investigation revealed that Astec's activities
in this context were limited to the mere assembly of all parts of electronic typewriters which
were imported and delivered to it at its premises by Silver Reed. These assembled electronic
typewriters were then exclusively sold on the Community market by the Silver Reed Group.
This group bore all costs between importation of the parts and the sale of the finished prod-
ucts. An assembly fee was paid to Astec by the Silver Reed Group but this fee constituted
only a small percentage of Silver Reed's total costs of sale. In these circumstances, this
assembly operation should be considered as having been carried out by Silver Reed.
143. The mechanics of EC antidumping law under which antidumping duties are imposed on
a country-wide basis (see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text) imply that EC production
facilities of companies which never exported the product concerned to the EC from the foreign
country, can nevertheless be covered by a parts proceeding. See Electronic Typewriters, supra
note 142, at 7, where typewriters produced by Matsushita in the United Kingdom were subjected
to antidumping duties under the parts amendment even though Matsushita had never exported
typewriters from Japan.
144. In Ball Bearings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 25) 90 (1989), it was held that increases
of, respectively, twenty-four percent in one year and forty percent in two years were substantial,
in particular because they had followed a period of stability.
145. Value of parts and materials from the country of export is determined on an "into-EC-
factory" basis. See, e.g., Electronic Typewriters, supra note 142, at 5; Electronic Scales, supra note
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used in the EC manufacturing operation must originate in the ex-
porting country subject to antidumping duties.146
It is especially the third condition that in practice has given rise to
problems because it necessitates decisions about the origin of the parts
or materials. This may create problems especially for parts assembled
in the EC or third countries from sub-parts because the question then
arises whether such parts must be treated as single parts or whether
they must be broken down into sub-parts. The reply to this inquiry is
portentous because if they are considered single parts, the value added
in the EC production process could perhaps be included in the value of
the parts and counted as non-exporting country content. In certain
instances, this may be conclusive for the origin of the whole parts.
Origin of the whole parts hinges on where the last substantial transfor-
mation or process took place. 147
During the past three years, EC practice in determining origin, es-
pecially of parts or subassemblies manufactured in the EC, has altered
significantly. In the first three cases, i.e., Typewriters, 148 Scales 1 49 and
Excavators,1 50 the Commission determined origin on different bases
depending on the status of the manufacturer of the parts or subassem-
blies. Thus, if the parts/subassemblies were manufactured in the EC
by the producer under investigation, or by a party related to such pro-
ducer, the parts/subassemblies were broken down into their sub-parts
(the molecular approach) and subassembly costs were always ostra-
cized.15' If the parts/subassemblies were manufactured in the EC by
141, at 2; Photocopiers, supra note 141, at 38. This includes cost items such as freight in the
exporting country, ocean freight and insurance, customs duties at the EC border, customs clear-
ance costs and freight in the EC (from the border to the factory). In addition, as products
shipped from the exporting country to the EC production facility involve transactions between
related parties, the Commission will want to see evidence that the prices of such products are at
arm's length. In other words, the Commission will look for evidence that price covers cost of
manufacture; selling; administrative and general expenses (SGA); and a reasonable profit.
146. Article 13(10)(a). Besides these three operative conditions, "other circumstances" such
as the variable costs incurred in the assembly or production operation, the research and develop-
ment carried out and the technology applied within the Community should be considered. In
practice, investigations have focused on the administratively convenient sixty/forty percent rule.
It should be noted that, if the Community Institutions would have attached importance to these
criteria, they might have been subjected to "local content" charges.
147. Within the context of the parts amendment, subassembly costs must be distinguished
from assembly costs. Assembly costs, i.e., the costs of assembling the parts into the completed
product, are never taken into account for the operation of the sixty/forty percent rule.
148. Electronic Typewriters, supra note 142.
149. Electronic Scales, supra note 141.
150. Hydraulic Excavators, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 24 (1988).
151. Electronic Scales, supra note 141, at 29, in which the Commission stated:
TEC-Keylard requested that the "transformation costs" of some subassemblies incurred in
its own factory should be included in the value of EEC parts. This request, however, cannot
be granted because the 'transformation costs' are part of the total costs of assembly or pro-
duction, they cannot be included in the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or
Summer 1990] 1159
1160 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 11:1119
an independent producer, a further distinction was made: If the parts/
subassemblies as assembled had acquired European origin, the whole
parts/subassemblies would be treated as European even though they
might have accommodated sub-parts from other countries. 52 If, on
the other hand, the parts/subassemblies had not acquired European
origin in the production process, the Commission adopted a case-by-
case approach whereby sometimes it broke down the subassemblies
into sub-parts (the molecular approach).153
These rules were revised spectacularly in the Photocopiers determi-
nations. 54 In these determinations, the Community Institutions zer-
oed in on the nature of the manufacturing process rather than on that
of the producer. Specifically, the authorities made a distinction be-
tween subassemblies and parts, based on the rule of thumb 'destruction
theory.' If a part could be taken apart without destroying any of the
sub-parts (in other words, if the part typically was merely screwed
together), it was considered to be a subassembly. Subassemblies were
production operation, but constitute a value added to these parts or materials in the assem-
bly or production process.
In Excavators, supra note 150, at 25, it said:
Komatsu (UK) Ltd calmed [sic] that the direct manufacturing costs of an important part
sub-assembled in its premises should be included in the Community parts value because the
process of production was not simple assembly but a genuine manufacturing operation.
This request, however, cannot be granted because the cost of assembly or production cannot
be included in the value of parts or materials used in the assembly or production operations
but constitutes a value added to these parts or materials in the assembly or production
process.
152. Electronic Scales, supra note 141, at 29, which states:
TEC.Keylard claimed that some subassembled items used for some models were of Commu-
nity origin. It was found that these items were assembled in the Community, from parts
imported from Japan and from parts purchased in the Community, by an independent Com-
munity producer. On the basis of information received from two sources, one being the
complainants carrying out virtually identical assembly operations themselves and the other
being the company referred to above, it was concluded that these subassemblies did consti-
tute a substantial transformation as required by Article 5 of Council Regulation (EEC) No.
802/68. The assembly operation and the manufacture of the components carried out in the
Community was of a substantial nature. The item was thus of Community origin.
153. Electronic Typewriters, supra note 142, at 5, states:
Canon claimed that one sub-assembled item which was the most costly individual one used
for some models was of Community origin. It was found, however, that this item was as-
sembled in the Community, entirely from parts imported from Japan, by a subsidiary com-
pany of a Japanese producer which normally manufactures these products in Japan and
supplies Canon's mother company there. On the basis of information received from two
sources, one being an electronic typewriter producer carrying out a virtually identical as-
sembly operation itself and the other being the company referred to above, it was concluded
that this subassembly did not constitute a substantial process or operation as required by
Article 5 .of Regulation (EEC) 802/68. The simple assembly operation carried out in the
Community was of a basic and unsubstantial nature compared with the manufacture of the
components which was performed in Japan. The item was thus not of Community origin.
See also the similar discussion with respect to Sharp, id., at 6, and the discussion with respect to
Brother, Typewriters, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 101) 26 (1988). For the guidelines given by
the Commission in this context, see Griffith, Antidumping Duties on Parts in the EEC, in AN.
TIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 317.
154. Plain Paper Photocopiers, supra note 141.
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treated in the same way as before, with a distinction being made be-
tween subassembly in-house1 55 or by a related supplier and subassem-
bly by an independent supplier. 156 If, however, in disassembling a
part, one or more of its sub-parts would be destroyed, it was treated as
a single part, whether it was produced in-house, by a related producer
or by an independent producer. The EC authorities determined that
with respect to single parts it was fitting to include subassembly costs
in the value of non-exporting country parts to the extent that the
whole single part had acquired Community (or non-exporting-coun-
try) origin. This approach was also followed in the Ball Bearings157
and the Printers15  proceedings. In the Printers15 9 proceeding, the
Community Institutions pronounced explicitly that printed circuit
boards (PCBs) constituted single parts.160 The Institutions added that
the origin of single parts was determined on the basis of the non-pref-
erential origin rules of Regulation 802/68.161
155. Id. at 38 reads as follows:
A number of companies requested that the assembly costs of certain subassemblies, incurred
in their own factory, should be included in the value of Community parts. This request,
however, cannot be granted because the cost of assembly cannot be included in the value of
parts or materials used in the assembly or production operations under Article 13 (10)....
156. Id:
Several companies concerned claimed that certain subassembled items were of Community
origin and that, in addition, they should be treated as parts within the meaning of Article 13(10) .... It was found, however, that these items were merely assembled in the Community,
mainly from parts imported from Japan, by independent suppliers. On the basis of informa-
tion obtained from the companies making the claim, it was concluded that this assembly did
not constitute a substantial process or operation as required by Article 5 .... The simple
assembly operation carried out in the Community was of a basic and unsubstantial nature
and was not sufficient to confer Community origin.
157. Ball Bearings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 25) 90, 91 (1989).
158. Serial-Impact Dot-Matrix Printers, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 52, 53 (1989); 32
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 291) 57, 58 (1989).
159. Id.
160. See also Plain Paper Photocopiers, 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 34) 28 (1990) (termina-
tion Ricoh Industrie France), where the Commission determined again that PCBs constitute
single parts in view of "the nature of their structure."
161. Specifically for PCBs the Commission in practice - by analogy to the specific origin
rules adopted with regard to radio and television receivers, Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
2632/70 on Determining the Origin of Radio and Television Receivers, 13 J.O. EUR. COMM. (NO.
L 279) 35 (1970), and tape recorders, Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 861/71 on Determining
the Origin of Tape Recorders, 14 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 11 (1971) - has sometimes
considered a PCB to be of EC origin if at least 45 percent value was added in the EC. This is one
of the present sources of friction with the United States. While the assembly or "stuffing" of
PCBs is very labor- or capital-intensive, it will in most cases not add enough value for the PCB to
be considered as originating in the EC. Companies which are likely to be the target of a parts
investigation will therefore scramble to source EC sub-parts, notably integrated circuits because
they need to have the "last substantial process or operation" take place in one country other than
the exporting country. As many integrated circuits (ICs) are manufactured exclusively in Japan,
the sourcing of the remaining ICs becomes even more important. Of course, if a company were
to decide to stuff its PCBs in the United States and use U.S. ICs, the resulting PCB would be
likely to have U.S. origin. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see EC Sends Conflict-
ing Signals on Clarifying Technical Rules for Circuit Boards, INSIDE U.S. TRADE 3, 4 (Oct. 27,
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As far as relief is concerned, it must be added that article 13(10)(c)
provides that "[t]he amount of duty collected shall be proportional to
that resulting from the application of the rate of the antidumping duty
applicable to the exporter of the complete product on the cif value of
the parts or materials imported .... ,162 Therefore, duties are levied
only with respect to the parts and materials originating in the export-
ing country and not on parts and materials originating elsewhere.
B. Production in Third Countries: Origin Investigations
As far as manufacture of product x in third countries by subsidiar-
ies of companies which have been found to have dumped the same
product x from their manufacturing base in country X is concerned,
the EC authorities have a choice.163 They can wait until they receive a
new complaint from the EC industry alleging that exports from coun-
try Y are entering the EC market at dumped prices with injurious
consequences. The EC would then normally open a new antidumping
proceeding and determine in the course of that proceeding whether
imports from country Y actually had country Y's origin. This is what
transpired in the Ball Bearings from Thailand 164 and Electronic Type-
writers from Taiwan 165 cases. In these cases,' 66 the Commission termi-
nated antidumping proceedings it had initiated on the ground that the
production processes carried out in such countries were not sufficient
to confer Thai or Taiwanese origin, respectively, on the products man-
ufactured in such countries. The practical consequence of these find-
ings was that the products assembled in Thailand and Taiwan
1989). See also EC 1992: An Update on US. Views: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (testimony of Peter Allgeier, Asst. USTR for Europe and the
Mediterranean); EC 1992: An Update on U.S. Views: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Eu-
rope and the Middle *East, and Subcommittee on International Economics, Policy and Trade,
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (testimony of Eugene McCal-
lister, Asst. Sec. of State for Econ. and Bus. Affairs).
162. Antidumping Regulation No. 2423/88, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 209) 1 (1988).
163. It should be noted that the decision which procedure to apply is very much inspired by
factual circumstances over which the Commission has, perhaps, little control. Thus, if an EC
industry brings an antidumping complaint against the product now coming from country Y and
such complaint contains sufficient evidence of dumping and resulting injury, Directorate-General
I of the Commission would open an antidumping proceeding and only in the course of such an
investigation perchance find out that actually the products manufactured in country Y have the
origin of country X. Origin investigations by Directorate-General XXI, on the other hand, may
start as a result of identical products being subjected to different treatment by the EC Member
States customs authorities, as a result of a complaint or a request by a producer concerned or for
a variety of other reasons.
164. Certain Ball Bearingsfrom Thailand, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 59) 30 (1985) (notice
of termination).
165. Electronic Typewriters from Taiwan, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 140) 52 (1986) (notice
of termination).
166. See Vermulst & Waer, supra note 136, for more detail.
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continued to be of Japanese origin and therefore de facto subjected to
the antidumping duties imposed with respect to such products
originating in Japan. 167
The Taiwanese termination was indirectly challenged by Brother
in Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Giessen.168
The customs authorities in Germany had verified Brother in Sep-
tember 1986 and determined that the typewriters produced in Taiwan
indeed could not be deemed to originate in Taiwan. 169 Brother ap-
pealed against this decision on the ground that the typewriters pro-
duced in Taiwan should be considered as originating in Taiwan on the
-basis of application of Regulation 802/68.170 The European Court of
Justice was summoned to apply the principles of articles 5 and 6 of
Regulation 802/68 to the situation at hand.
The Court contrasted "simple" assembly operations and other
types of assembly operations 7 : a simple assembly operation, defined
as an operation which does not require a specially qualified labour
force, precision machinery, or a specially equipped factory, could not
confer origin. Other types of assembly could confer origin depending
on fulfilment of one of two tests, in order of precedence:
an assembly process representing, from a technical point of
view and having regard to the definition of the assembled prod-
uct, the decisive stage of production in the course of which the
parts are assembled into the finished product, and in the course of
which the product acquires its specific material qualities; or
167. As an illustration: The proceeding against Brother was terminated on May 23, 1986.
On June 5, 1986, the Commission sent a memorandum to all Member States advising them to
apply the antidumping duty applicable to exports of typewriters from Japan also to Brother's
typewriters coming from Taiwan. See Brother Industries v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 3757.
168. Judgment of December 13, 1989, not yet reported. Brother Taiwan and Brother UK
had in first instance brought a direct action against this decision on the basis of article 173(2) of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. This direct action had been declared inadmissible by the Court in
Brother Industries v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 3757, because the decision did not constitute an
act which caused injury to Brother: the actual determination with regard to the origin of the
typewriters produced by Brother in Taiwan was in the hands of the Member States.
169. As a result, such typewriters were deemed to originate in Japan and the antidumping
duty applicable to Brother Japan of twenty-one percent ad valorem was applied to the typewrit-
ers exported from Taiwan with retroactive effect. The consequence was that the Hauptzollamt
Giessen ordered Brother to pay 3,210,277.83 DM in antidumping duties.170. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 802/68 of 27 June 1968 on the Common Definition of the
Concept of the Origin of Goods, 11 J.O. EUR. COMM. (No. L 148) 1 (1968). For an extensive
discussion, see Vermulst & Waer, supra note 136. Brother claimed that while most of the parts
came from Japan, they were mounted and assembled in Taiwan in a fully equipped factory into
ready-for-use typewriters. In the opinion of Brother, this was furthermore not a case of diversion
because the factory had existed for a long time and typewriters produced there had been exported
to the EC since 1982.
171. The Court alluded here to the third standard of Annex D. 1. of the Kyoto Convention.
Michigan Journal of International Law
a considerable increase in the value added in the assembly
process.
The Court underscored that the value added test can be contemplated
as a subsidiary element only in cases where appraisal on the basis of a
technical test is inconclusive. 172
The Court interpreted article 6 as not justifying a presumption of
circumvention of antidumping duties in cases where the transfer of an
assembly process from a country where the parts are manufactured to
another country involves factories already in existence. However, ac-
cording to the Court, an exception to this would be the situation where
the entry into force of the regulation imposing the duties and the
transfer of the assembly operations coincide; in such a situation the
producer should prove that he had good reasons - other than circum-
venting the antidumping duties - for transferring his assembly
process.
Rather than opening a new antidumping proceeding, the EC may
alternatively dispute the origin of the products now coming from the
third country and conduct an origin investigation. This is what befell
the photocopier plants of Ricoh in California and Mita in Hong Kong.
Following an on-the-spot investigation in California by officials of
Directorate-General I and Directorate-General XXI, the Commission
took the view that the photocopiers produced by Ricoh in the United
States should be denied U.S. origin. In the absence of a qualified ma-
jority on this matter within the Origin Committee and the Council, the
Commission enacted Regulation (EEC) No. 207/89 on the origin of
photocopiers 7 3 which - although couched in general terms - was
essentially tailor-made for the Ricoh situation. This Regulation pro-
vides that the manufacture of photocopiers accompanied by the manu-
facture of the harness, drums, rollers, side plates, roller bearings,
screws and nuts shall not confer origin. 174
172. The Court refrained from laying down a concrete positive percentage of value added
sufficient to confer origin other than that it should be considerable (this, in turn, should be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis). The Court confined itself to the statement that in a production
process where only two countries are involved, a value added of less than ten percent in the
assembly process is insufficient. The Court explicitly repudiated the view that a specific intellec-
tual operation accompany the assembly in order to confer origin.
173. Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2971/89 of ]] July 1989 on Determining the Origin
of Photocopying Apparatus, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 196) 24 (1989). For background infor-
mation, see Agence Europe No. 5057, at 7 (July 14, 1989); Agence Europe No. 5058 (July 15,
1989).
174. The Ricoh case well illustrates one difficulty with the application of the origin rules to
determine whether third-country-diverion occurs: it does not allow the administering authorities
to sculpt the nature and the level of the relief to the circumstances of the case. Thus, the finding
that the photocopiers manufactured by Ricoh in the United States had not acquired U.S. origin
- and continued to be of Japanese origin - meant that Ricoh's exports to the EC from its
California plant could be subjected to the full antidumping duty of twenty percent imposed on
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On the basis of an origin investigation conducted at Mita's Hong
Kong premises, the Commission arrived at the conclusion that the
photocopiers made by Mita in Hong Kong did possess Hong Kong
origin and advised the members of the Origin Committee accordingly.
As the members of the Origin Committee agreed unanimously with
the conclusions of the Commission, the case was dealt with
informally. 175
The above examples show that in the EC, third country assembly
is essentially tested on the basis of application of origin rules. If a
product assembled in third country Y has acquired the origin of coun-
try Y, the assembly will normally be considered genuine. If, on the
other hand, the product has not acquired country Y origin in the as-
sembly process, and continues to have the origin of country X, any
antidumping duties applicable to the producer in country X will also
be applied to the product now coming from country Y. The Court in
Brother held that even if country Y origin is conferred in the assembly
process, origin could still be denied if it was determined that the coun-
try Y assembly process was established with diversion considerations
in mind, thereby stretching the framework for analyzing diversion
even further. As will be discussed in more detail below, 76 these au-
thors do not believe that origin rules, let alone even further-going rules
based on some kind of "presumed intent" test, form an appropriate
yardstick for deciding on diversion because such rules blur the crucial
distinction between evasion and avoidance of antidumping duties.
C. EC-Production and Third-Country-Production: When Does
Production Constitute Diversion?
We have seen that the EC applies different sets of rules to analyze
whether production operations within the EC and production opera-
tions in third countries can be considered to constitute diversion oper-
ations. This may lead (and has in practice led) to the result that
products which are manufactured in the EC and for which EC origin
certificates have been obtained may nevertheless fail the 60/40 percent
rule. 177 On the other hand, compared to origin investigations, parts
Ricoh in 1987 in the Plain Paper Photocopiers proceeding despite the fact that such photocopiers
presumably included a substantial U.S. value added. In other words, antidumping duties could
in part be levied on U.S. parts, materials and overheads.
175. See I. VAN BAEL & J.-F. BELLIS, ANTIDUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION
LAWS OF THE EEC 229 n.28 (1989).
176. See infra notes 259-81 and accompanying text.
177. As the origin test is less stringent than the parts test in terms of components value,
foreign producers facing high antidumping duties may in fact be inspired to invest in third coun-
tries rather than in the EC. The cost savings of avoiding payment of CIF costs and customs
duties on the finished products (but not on the parts) when establishing production within the EC
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proceedings are relatively well regulated. Article 13(10)(d) of the An-
tidumping Regulation provides that the normal procedural guarantees
for parties in antidumping proceedings also apply in parts investiga-
tions.178 Such procedural guarantees are sadly lacking in the context
of origin investigations conducted by the EC Commission. 79 The ar-
ticle 13(10) procedure is also preferable to the origin procedure in its
possibilities for adapting the nature and the level of the relief to the
modalities of the situation at hand.
V. AUSTRALIA AND CANADA
A. Canada
In Canada the question has arisen several times whether import ed
finished products and parts could cause injury to Canadian production,
of the finished product.180 The answer of the Import Tribunal would
seem to have been affirmative: imported finished and partly finished' 8 '.
-zippers are like Canadian-produced zippers, imported bicycles and bi-
cycle parts are like Canadian-produced bicycles and imported paint
brushes and paint brush heads are like Canadian-produced paint,
brushes. This expansive like product definition enabled the Tribunal
to find injury to Canadian production of the finished product by rea-
son of imports of the like finished product and its parts without going
may in some cases be easily recompensed by the lower production costs in third countries. A low
cost of production in a third country, if combined with effective monitoring of costs and prices,
may also place the producer in a better position to brave a conceivable new antidumping investi-
gation initiated against this third country. While production within the EC manifestly curbs
initiation of an EC case against such EC production, subsequent exports from EC production
facilities might be subjected to antidumping cases in other jurisdictions. This cost/benefit analy-
sis might change if third country assembly were to become actionable under GATT.
178. This means, inter alia, that parties have the rights to have access to non-confidential
information submitted by other parties, to be heard, to have confrontation meetings with the
other party (if the other party agrees) and to be informed of the essential facts and considerations
on the basis of which it intends to take action.
179. In addition, by analogy to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice in the
antidumping area, it seems incontestable that parties directly affected by the outcome of a parts
proceeding can challenge the relevant Community determination directly before the Court on the
basis of article 173(2) of the EEC Treaty. This is, again, in contrast to the situation in origin
proceedings. See Vermulst & Waer, supra note 136.
180. See Magnus, The Canadian Antidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 4, at 206-08, and the cases cited therein.
181. In Slide Fasteners or Zippers and Parts thereof Manufactured by Yoshida Kogyo KK,
Tokyo, Japan (Anti-Dumping Tribunal [hereinafter ADT] 1-74), partly finished zippers were
defined as follows:
Parts. . . includes all articles and materials, whether finished or not and regardless of length,
so advanced in manufacture as to commit them by their design or construction to intended
end use as components of slide fasteners, e.g., without limiting the generality of the forego-
ing, chain or stinger of any length; interlocking elements of any length, whether in spiral,
coil, ladder or other form; and tape of any length designed or constructed to have interlock-
ing elements attached thereto.
Anti-Diversion Rules
into the separate question whether imports of the parts caused injury
to Canadian production of the parts. Thus, in Zippers, for example,
the Import Tribunal stated on this issue:
An issue of some importance which was raised was whether, when the
preliminary determination includes components or parts of a product,
each component or part is to be considered as an article of commerce
and a case made to establish injury to the production in Canada of that
component or part.
That proposition cannot hold in this case. The Deputy Minister has
been extremely careful in stating that the parts he has determined were
dumped were articles "so advanced in manufacture as to commit them by
their design or construction to intended end use as components of slide
fasteners. " Granted that zipper chain, or sliders, can be sold separately
and in that context considered articles of commerce, one cannot ignore
the fact that all Yoshida exports of components are being sold to its
wholly-owned subsidiary in Canada, and that the components which the
Deputy Minister says are being dumped are being assembled for the most
part in Canada by the subsidiary for distribution and sale in Canada as
finished zippers at prices, one can assume, which reflect the dumped prices
of the components. 182
Indeed, it would appear that in a number of Canadian cases, Canadian
complainants themselves in fact relied (to a substantial degree) on for-
eign-produced parts. Thus, in Single Row Tapered Roller Bea'ings
and Parts thereof from Japan,183 the complainant Canadian Timken
Ltd. imported the cups and the cones and only performed a simple
assembly in Canada.184 In Color Television Receiving Sets from Ko-
rea, 8 5 the Canadian Import Tribunal accepted the standing of the Ca-
nadian industry to file the complaint despite the following findings of
fact:
For the most part, Canadian production of the subject goods is an assem-
bly process with very little actual manufacturing of parts and compo-
nents. The domestic manufacturers generally source the major television
components (chassis, picture tube, tuner and cabinet) from related com-
panies located in the Far East, the United States or Mexico. A signifi-
cant exception to the rule is the sourcing of 20" picture tube
requirements by some of the producers from Mitsubishi, which manufac-
tures such tubes at its Midland, Ontario, plant (formerly owned by
RCA)."' 86
182. Id. (emphasis added).
183. ADT 8-75.
184. Written comments of Richard Gottlieb (May 9, 1990).
185. Canadian Import Tribunal [hereinafter CIT] 13-87.
186. In Cars from Korea (CIT-13-87), the scope of the proceeding was defined so as to cover
"cars (including those in a semi knocked-down condition), with or without options such as auto-
matic transmissions, produced by or on behalf of Hyundai .... Semi knocked-down cars, in
turn, were defined as cars consisting of "most of the major parts and assemblies necessary to
assemble the vehicle. Body components (floor pan, firewall, roof, rear quarter panels, and pillars)
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On the other hand, in Power Conversion Systems from Japan and
France,8 7 the Import Tribunal determined that a dumped bid by the
French producer Jeumont-Schneider had not caused material injury,
inter alia, on the basis that if the Canadian complainant would have
been awarded the contract, "a considerable portion of the subject
goods would not have been produced in Canada in any event." This
was because the Canadian complainant had entered into a joint ven-
ture agreement with the French producer Alsthom for purposes of
tendering on the request for tenders under which the rectifier and the
parts of the power conversion system would have been provided by
Alsthom.1 88
While Revenue Canada in all cases had defined the class of goods
so as to include the parts,18 9 apparently no separate dumping findings
with regard to the parts were made. tg° It would appear' 91 that Reve-
nue Canada has also occasionally applied antidumping duties applica-
ble to country X to imports of the like product coming from country
Y in cases where it considered the non-country-X value added
insufficient. 192
B. Australia
The Australian Customs Service (ACS) has thus far interpreted the
like product definition strictly. 9 3 Although the issue has apparently
not actually arisen, one commentator has argued that:
Australian law would require the imported goods to be considered in the
condition in which they are imported. The Australian industry produc-
ing "like goods" therefore would be a component manufacturer which
may not also be the maker of the whole product, notwithstanding that
are assembled into a body shell and shipped in a white form, that is, not primed or otherwise
painted." While there was evidence that the Canadian producers were not doing much more
than performing similar assembly operations in Canada, in the end the Import Tribunal did not
enter into the merits of such arguments because it found no injury on other grounds.
187. ADT 13-84.
188. The Tribunal noted that the parts to be supplied by Alsthom would have accounted for
some thirty percent of all goods under investigation involved in the bid and that such parts would
have to be excluded from the injury investigation anyway.
189. However, according to Gottlieb, Revenue Canada in practice sometimes has also ap-
plied antidumping duties to goods assembled in Canada from imported components where Cana-
dian content was considered to be insufficient even when the description of the goods covered by
the antidumping duty order did not include "parts." Written comments of Richard Gottlieb
(May 9, 1990).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. This seems comparable to the Ricoh case in the EC, discussed in notes 173-74 and
accompanying text, supra.
193. See Steele. The Australian Antidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, supra note 4, at 263-65.
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the imported components are subsequently assembled in Australia to
make up the whole product.194 It would seem therefore that the ACS
would require dumping of the parts and resulting injury to the Austra-
lian industry producing the parts.
VI. THE GATT NEGOTIATIONS 195
As of the moment of writing, only the United States and the EC
have put forward concrete proposals in GATT with regard to diver-
sion. Other Code signatories thus far have limited their submissions
on diversion to recognizing the problem and/or reacting to the U.S.
and EC proposals.
A. The United States Proposal
The United States has tabled a shopping list of "diversionary prac-
tices" with regard to which it advocates multilateral action. More spe-
cifically, the U.S. proposes a three-track structure which represents a
sliding scale of perceived seriousness of diversion. Track I focuses on
instances of "clear circumvention." Track II covers several practices
alleged to be "recurrent injurious dumping," while Track III ad-
dresses situations in which a foreign producer repeatedly dumps prod-
ucts within the same general category of merchandise ("corporate
offenders").
1. Track I
Track I applies to production changes which are so minor that
when diversion is determined to exist, a de novo investigation of dump-
ing and injury is considered superfluous; rather, additional products
could simply be included within the scope of the original antidumping
duty order. This track identifies three (really four) types of
circumvention:
(1) instances where parts and components are shipped from
the country covered by the dumping finding to the importing
country for assembly or completion into a product covered by the
dumping finding, and the value of the parts and components im-
ported from the country subject to the dumping finding is equal
to or exceeds [X] percent of the total value of the assembled or
finished product;1 96
194. Id. at 265.
195. This analysis is based on the text of the various proposals, as published in the Nov. 24,
1989, Jan. 5, 1990, and Feb. 9, 1990, issues of INSIDE U.S. TRADE, and on statements made
during the conference The Reform of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code (Brussels, Mar. 16-17,
1990).
196. It should be noted that the proposal differs in certain respects from the current U.S.
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(2) instances where parts and components are shipped from
the country covered by the dumping finding to a third country for
assembly or completion into the product covered by the dumping
finding, which is then exported to the importing country, and the
value of the parts and components imported from the country
subject to the dumping finding is equal to or exceeds [X] percent
of the total value of the assembled or finished product;197 and
(3) instances where producers in a supplier country covered
by the dumping finding begin exporting to the importing country
(a) altered or (b) later-developed products. 198
In deciding on Track I diversion, the United States suggests that
investigating authorities consider:
(i) whether imports of the parts or components have in-
creased since the entry into force of the antidumping measure;
(ii) the relationship between the exporter of the parts, the
producer covered by the antidumping measure and the assembler
in the importing country; and
(iii) whether the most significant parts or components are be-
ing shipped to the importing country for assembly or
completion. 199
A similar analysis is proposed with respect to merchandise assem-
bled or completed in a third country. 2°° In all three categories of di-
provision: thus, the present provision does not contain any percentage requirement. See supra
notes 111-18 and accompanying text. The proposal may therefore be more restrictive - depend-
ing on the percentage requirement - than actual U.S. law. Section 781(a) of the Tariff Act of
1930 (codified as 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (Supp. 1 1989)) also requires a consultation procedure be-
tween the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission as to whether a "sig-
nificant injury issue is presented by the proposed inclusion." If so, the Commission must
determine whether the inclusion would be inconsistent with its prior affirmative finding. In fact,
the proposal goes further in requiring an injury review in all cases of alleged circumvention. The
administering authorities would furthermore be required not to impose duties if such imposition
would be inconsistent with the prior injury determination.
197. Compare sections 781(b) and (e) of the Tariff Act of 1930, codified as amended in 19
U.S.C. §§ 1677j(b), (e) (Supp. 1 1989).
198. Products covered in this category include: merchandise which is altered slightly placing
it outside the stated scope of the original measure; merchandise to which additional functions
have been added that do not alter the primary function of the product; and later generations of
the product subject to the original investigation.
199. It would appear that these conditions are not cumulative.
200. In particular, the proposal suggests examination of:
(i) whether shipments of the parts or components to the third country have increased
since the entry into force of the antidumping measure;
(ii) whether exports to the importing country of the merchandise assembled or com-
pleted in the third country have increased since the entry into force of the antidumping
measure;
(iii) the relationship between the exporter of the parts, the producer covered by the
antidumping measure, and the assembler or finisher in the third country; and
(iv) whether the most significant parts or components are being shipped to the third
country for assembly or completion.
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version, the proposal would permit authorities to impose duties
retroactively from the moment the diversion procedure is initiated -
if circumvention has been determined to exist.
2. Track II
In contrast to Track I, Track II deals with situations where
changes in the production of the product are more substantial, yet al-
legedly result in negating the relief afforded by the original antidump-
ing measure. More specifically, Track II covers circumstances where
a foreign producer undertakes actions beyond those which can be de-
scribed as "classic circumvention" and which are dealt with under
Track I. The U.S. proposal implicitly acknowledges that GATT arti-
cle VI in such situations requires a showing of dumping and resulting
injury.
Track II encompasses a ragbag of five different situations where:
(1) a producer subject to a dumping finding exports parts or
components to the importing country for assembly or completion
by a related party into a product covered by the dumping finding,
and the value of the parts or components imported from the
country subject to the dumping finding is less than [X] percent 20 1
of the total value of the assembled or finished product;
(2) a producer subject to a dumping finding exports parts or
components to a third country for assembly or completion by a
related party into a product covered by the dumping finding,
which is then exported to the importing country, and the value of
the parts or components imported from the country subject to the
dumping finding is less than [X] percent of the assembled or fin-
ished product;
(3) a third country producer related to a producer subject to a
dumping finding exports to the importing country the product
subject to the dumping finding;
(4) within a single exporting country, a producer exports
merchandise that incorporates as a major input20 2 a product that
is covered by a dumping finding in excess of [Y] percent, and the
Likewise, in cases involving exports of altered or later-developed products, investigating authori-
ties are to consider whether such exports have increased since the entry into force of the original
antidumping measures.
201. The proposal states that it may be appropriate to establish a "safe harbor" (i.e., a per-
centage threshold below which parties may be certain that Track II procedures will not be
invoked).
202. The U.S. proposal does not define the term "major input."
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producer is also related to or is the producer of the input product;
and
(5) a third country producer related to a producer of an input
product subject to a dumping finding in excess of [Y] percent ex-
ports merchandise that incorporates that input as a major input.
Analysis reveals that Track II basically covers three distinct types of
situations. The first two can be seen as parallels of the situations de-
scribed in the first two situations of Track I (and U.S. law). The third
situation is a variation on the MNC provision, but without the safe-
guards. It effectively penalizes a multinational producer for deciding
to shift production from one country to another following the imposi-
tion of antidumping duties. The fourth and fifth situation pertain to
"input dumping. ' 20 3 The label "recurrent injurious dumping" is
therefore a misnomer because it does not really describe the type of
problems addressed.
In Track II situations, the United States believes that - while it is
necessary to determine through a full investigation whether dumping
and injury have occurred - such an investigation should be con-
ducted on an accelerated schedule and incorporate special rules and
procedures that reflect the fact of the prior related dumping and injury
determinations. As in Track I cases, retroactivity of duties is
proposed.
3. Track III
While Tracks I and II focus on changes in the production of the
product covered by the original antidumping measure, Track III deals
with a foreign producer who repeatedly dumps merchandise within
the same general category. To deter such behavior, the United States
submits that continuous dumping by individual firms (although of dif-
ferent products) also be penalized under certain circumstances
through the imposition of duties from the point of initiation of the
antidumping investigation.
It is hard to gauge whether Track III is a serious proposal or a red
herring. If the former, these authors believe that it is nonsensical be-
cause it singles out and discriminates without any apparent justifica-
tion against companies which produce a limited product range. It also
disregards the fact that certain product sectors (chemicals, steel, con-
sumer electronics) have shown a high activity in filing antidumping
203. Compare section 780 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended in 1988 and section 773 (e)
(3) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677i and 1677b(eX3), respectively,
concerning the calculation of major inputs between related parties, discussed in notes 111-127,
supra, and accompanying text.
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complaints without there being any empirical evidence that these types
of products are dumped more frequently than others.
4. Analysis
The U.S. proposal is very similar to the present anti-diversion pro-
visions in U.S. law. It goes, however, much further, both ratione
materiae and in the type of sanctions considered appropriate2°4 where
diversion has been found to take place.205
The main problem of the U.S. proposal, in the view of these au-
thors, is its vagueness. More than anything, the proposal introduces a
series of concepts. If the proposal were to be adopted as it stands, it
would undoubtedly create enormous uncertainty. Surely, the actiona-
ble practices need to be defined in as much detail as possible so that
companies know in advance where they stand. Even if that were done,
certain aspects of the proposal, either alone or in combination with
other elements, overshoot. Thus, for example, the withholding of ap-
praisement ab initio would appear justified only in the clearest cases of
circumvention, and certainly not for Track II and Track III situations.
As far as the concrete proposals are concerned, most problematic
is perhaps the United States Track II proposal relating to "input
dumping." The operative amendment proposed by the United States
would authorize the administering authorities in the importing coun-
try to include in the cost of production of the like product the cost of
production of the major input product, provided that such cost is
higher than what the value of the input would have been in an arm's
length transaction. 2°6 This amendment would therefore require the
administering authorities to examine not only the cost of production of
the input, but also its arm's length value and then apply the higher of
the two. It therefore contains the same tilt as the present U.S. provi-
sion.20 7 In addition, the provision would also create heavy burdens
not only on the producer/exporter concerned, but also on potential
importers of the finished product who essentially would be required to
examine the components' breakdown of the finished product in order
to determine the product's potential liability to an accelerated proce-
dure. Furthermore, the amendment's focus on the level of the dump-
ing margin seems rather misplaced. It would perhaps have been more
appropriate to focus on the value added in the production of the fin-
204. I.e., the withholding of appraisement as of the moment the inquiry is instituted and the
possible retroactive levy of antidumping duties as of that date.
205. It is possible, of course, that this a negotiating technique of the United States.
206. See proposed amendment to article 2(4) of the Code.
207. See supra notes 111-127 and accompanying text.
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ished product. Thus, one could imagine a rule that, if substantial
value is added in the production of the finished product which incor-
porates a dumped component, the presumption is that the finished
product is not dumped unless the contrary is proven after a full and
normal investigation.
B. The EC Proposal
The EC essentially advocates multilateral adoption of its parts
amendment logic. 208 In addition, the EC has made one other proposal
which should be linked to diversion. It has proposed an amendment
to the GATT Anti-Dumping Code which would authorize the ad-
ministering authorities in the importing country to establish a special
normal value in cases involving multinational corporations (hereinaf-
ter: the MNC proposal).
The EC would like to have an explicit provision in the Code
"confirming" 209
that in cases, where the products exported are produced by a subsidiary
in a third country, and the parent company sells the same products on its
own home market, and where there are no or insufficient sales of the
subsidiary in the market of the third country, the prices of the parent
corporation in its home market can be used to calculate normal value,
taking account of all relevant differences in costs.
The EC explains its rationale for this provision as follows:
Experience has shown that the increasing globalization of production
and trade provides corporations or groups, operating in more than one
country, with the possibility of concealing certain price discrimination
practices. Specifically, there are situations where such corporations ex-
port at low prices the products that are produced by a subsidiary in a
third country while at the same time selling the same product at very
high prices in its [sic] own home market. Thus, they subsidize low-price
export sales with high profits made on the home market. Since nor-
mally, there are no sales made by the subsidiary in the exporting country
the question arises as to how to establish normal value. In the majority
of these cases reference cannot be made to the constructed value in the
country of export since no data are available there on cost elements like
research and development, depreciation, selling costs, overheads and
profits. Indeed most of these costs are generally borne by the parent
company. On the other hand reference can be made to prices on the
domestic market of the parent company. 210
208. See supra notes 139-162 and accompanying text for discussion of the parts amendment.
209. The phrase "confirming" is misleading. The 1979 Code does not at all address this issue
and adoption of any such provision would arguably contravene not only the Code, but also
GAT" article VI. See supra note 90 and accompanying text for more detail.
210. There is a crucial flaw in this logic. The EC proposal essentially equates differences in
prices with differences in profit margins. The fact that prices in one market are higher than prices
in another market is perfectly all right as long as such differences are the result of differences in
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Although nowhere acknowledged in the EC proposal, the EC seems to
have borrowed the idea for this separate provision for calculation of
normal value for MNCs from the U.S. 1974 Trade Act provision.211
The question should be raised whether there is any need for this
amendment. To date, the Commerce Department has used the 1974
provision only twice.212 Furthermore, the EC - when confronted
with a subsidiary of a parent company located in country X, but pro-
ducing in and exporting from country Y - has thus far been able to
deal adequately with the situation by using its normal rules on con-
structed value. It has utilized in such cases the cost of manufacture of
the subsidiary and added either the SGA of the subsidiary in ques-
tion213 or the SGA of other producers located in the same country
which did sell in sufficient quantities on the domestic market.
The EC proposal would in theory have the same outcome because
adjustments would have to be made for "all relevant differences in
costs." In practice, however, it seems likely that the EC would essen-
tially use the prices or cost of the parent company located in country
X for the determination of normal value for the subsidiary located in
country Y and would require the subsidiary located in country Y to
prove any and all cost differences. It would be extremely burdensome
for the subsidiary located in country Y to evidence, for example, that
the high distribution costs incurred on sales by the parent company in
country X, would not have been incurred on sales of the same product
in country Y. Typically, the subsidiary would not sell in country Y
and therefore it would be practically impossible for it to prove that, if
it had sold in country Y, it would not have incurred distribution costs,
similar to those incurred by the parent company in country X. It
costs and not of differences in profit. This was the essential background for adoption of an-
tidumping laws. Present EC (and to a lesser extent, U.S.) dumping margin calculation methodol-
ogy, however, has in part departed from this basic rationale because only direct costs are
deducted in cases involving domestic sales through related sales companies. For a more detailed
discussion, see Vermulst & Waer, Hof van Institie der Europese Geemenschappen, 7 Mei 1987,
Zaken 240/84 NTN Toyo Bearing Company, 255/84 Nachi Fujikoshi Corporation, 216/84 Koyo
Seiko, 258/84 Nippon Seiko KK, 260/84 Minebea Company Ltd. v. Raad, Arrest van 7 Maart
1987, 36 ThDSCHRIr VOOR EUROPEES EN ECoNOMISCH RECHT 106 (1988); Hindley, Dumping
and the Far East Trade of the European Community, II WORLD ECON. 445 (1988). One may
also wonder how the EC proposes to calculate differences in costs in view of the EC's very state-
ment that the cost in the third country cannot be calculated.
211. This provision is discussed in notes 46-60, supra, and accompanying text.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Certain Ball Bearings from Japan and Singapore, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
79) 8 (1984), where the EC was confronted with a Minebea plant producing in and exporting
from Singapore. The Minebea plant sold virtually no ball bearings on the Singapore market.
The Commission therefore decided to use constructed value consisting of Minebea's total cost of
materials and manufacture, including overheads, and a profit margin of 6 percent, apparently
"considered to be reasonable in the light of the relevant industry's performance during a repre-
sentative profitable period."
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should be noted that the above assumes that allowance would be made
for indirect cost differences. It is not at all clear from the EC proposal
whether the EC would in fact make such allowance.
3. Responses of the Other Major Contracting Parties
Korea rejects the incorporation of anti-diversion measures which
would impose antidumping duties on additional products not subject
to the original dumping investigation.214 To this end, Korea proposes
that the Code prohibit the imposition of duties on imports of compo-
nents/parts based solely on findings of dumping of the finished prod-
uct, unless the components/parts are found to be "like" finished
product. Likewise, the Code should forbid the imposition of duties on
a finished product based solely on a finding of dumping of the compo-
nents or parts, unless it is determined that the two are like products.
Moreover, Korea suggests that the Code expressly provide that a
product produced in a third country from parts produced in, or ex-
ported from, a country whose exports of the product or its parts are
subject to antidumping duties, shall not be subject to antidumping du-
ties unless authorities determine that it too is being dumped and caus-
ing injury.
Japan rejects the imposition of antidumping duties on newly devel-
oped products on the basis of their similarity to products already sub-
ject to antidumping findings. Japan advocates the establishment of
criteria that would identify under which circumstances new products
may be included in scope of the original antidumping measure. 215
Australia acknowledges that diversion constitutes a problem which
should be handled multilaterally. However, any anti-diversion meas-
ures should not hinder legitimate investments. The Nordic countries
express a desire to examine the report of the "screwdriver panel"
before making any specific proposals on this subject.
Finally, Canada proposes that the Code set forth the precise condi-
tions under which an existing antidumping measure may be extended,
based on the principle that diversion exists only where the value added
in third country or domestic assembly is minimal and the conditions
are such that domestic producers of the assembled good continue to be
injured.216 In formulating these guidelines, consideration should be
214. This proposal may have been the result of the U.S. Gold Star case, discussed in notes 86-
87, supra, and accompanying text.
215. Japan's focus on newly-developed products may have been inspired by its experience in
the DRAM and EPROM cases in the United States and the EC.
216. Canada is one of the main users of antidumping actions. On the other hand, it has also
been the defendant in a substantial number of antidumping proceedings, especially in the United
States. This may account for the balanced character of Canada's proposal.
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given to:
(1) whether the domestic producers of the assembled good
also produce the parts;
(2) whether domestic producers of the assembled good also
import parts from the subject country; and
(3) the extent to which there is a separate market for parts
and components. 21 7
VII. THE GATT PANEL REPORT ON ARTICLE 13(10) OF
COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2423/88
A. The Findings of the GA TT Panel
In 1988, Japan requested the formation of a GATT Panel
["Panel"] to decide whether article 13(10) of Council Regulation
(EEC) 2423/88218 and the measures taken pursuant to that provision
were contrary to GATT. In October 1988 a GATT Panel was estab-
lished.219 The GATT Panel officially communicated its findings to the
GATT Contracting Parties on March 22, 1990.220 The arguments of
the EC and Japan and the findings of the Panel are discussed below.221
Japan argued that the duties imposed under article 13(10) (herein-
after anti-circumvention duties), the acceptance of undertakings under
article 13(10) and the provisions of article 13(10) as such, are inconsis-
tent with the EC's obligations under articles II and III of the GATT
and cannot be justified by article VI of the GATT. The EC argued
that both the application of article 13(10) and article 13(10) itself were
justified by article XX(d) of the GATT.
Japan further argued that the administration of article 13(10) by
the EC contravenes article X of the GATT concerning the publication
and administration of trade regulations, among others, because the EC
failed to publish the criteria for accepting undertakings and to deter-
mine the origin of parts in a uniform manner. The EC argued that it
217. The Canadian proposal on this point is very similar to the proposal made by the ECAT
(Emergency Committee for American Trade) Group in the United States.
218. See supra notes 139-62 and accompanying text.
219. The panel was chaired by Joseph Greenwald, former U.S. ambassador to the European
Community. The other members were Timothy Grosser (New Zealand) and Christopher
Thomas (Canada). See Trade Policy: The European Commission's Objections to the Conclusions of
the GA 7T Panel on the "Screwdriver" Aspect of the Antidumping Policy, Agence Europe No.
5235, at 7 (Apr. 13, 1990).
220. EC Blocks GATT Adoption of Report on 'Screwdriver' Antidumping Case 1992- THE
EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (BNA) 2 (1990).
221. Excerpts of the GATT Panel Report have been published in INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Spe-
cial Report, at 2-7 (Mar. 30, 1990). The summary of the GATT panel's findings which follows is
based on this publication, it being the only public source available at the time of writing of this
article.
1177Summer 1990]
Michigan Journal of International Law
has acted in conformity with that provision.222
The GATT Panel examined, successively, the GATT compatibility
of:
(1) the imposition of duties under article 13(10);
(2) the acceptance of undertakings under article 13(10);
(3) article 13(10) itself; and
(4) the non-publication of criteria for accepting parts under-
takings and the administration of the rules of origin for parts and
materials.
1. The Imposition of Duties Under Article 13(10)
The Panel stressed the importance of determining the exact nature
of the EC anti-circumvention duties in view of the differences between
articles II(1) and III(2).223 According to article II(l)(b) the imposi-
tion of "ordinary customs duties" for purposes of protection is allowed
unless they exceed tariff bindings. All other duties or charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with importation are in principle
prohibited in respect of products for which there are binding tariff
schedules. By contrast, article 111(2) provides that internal taxes that
discriminate against imported products are prohibited, whether or not
the products are bound by tariff schedules. The question therefore was
whether the anti-circumvention duties qualified as "customs duties" or
as "internal taxes." The Panel noted that the anti-circumvention du-
ties are imposed, not on imported parts or materials, but on the fin-
ished products assembled or produced in the EC.224
The EC nevertheless argued that the anti-circumvention duties
should be considered as customs duties imposed "in connection with
importation" within the meaning of article II(l)(b). First, the purpose
of these duties was to eliminate circumvention of antidumping duties
on finished products and therefore these duties are by nature identical
to antidumping duties. Second, the duties are collected by customs
authorities under procedures identical to those applied for the collec-
tion of customs duties, similarly form part of the resources of the EC,
and relate to parts and materials which were considered not to be "in
free circulation" within the EC.225
222. See id. at 2.
223. In this respect Japan argued that the anti-circumvention duties could be considered to
be either duties imposed on or in connection with importation within the meaning of Art.
II(I)(B) or internal taxes within the meaning of article 111(2). The EC argued that the anti-
circumvention duties could not be considered to fall under article 111(2). See INSIDE U.S. TRADE
supra note 221, at 2.
224. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 2.
225. See id. at 3.
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The Panel disagreed. First, the Panel determined that since arti-
cles I, II, III and the Note to article III refer to charges "imposed on
importation,". "collected ... at the time or point of importation" and
applied "to an imported product and to the like domestic product,"
the policy purpose of a charge is not relevant.226 What matters is
whether the charge is due on importation or at the time or point of
importation or whether it is collected internally. The Panel also noted
that the policy purpose of charges is frequently difficult to determine
and therefore substantial legal uncertainty would be created if this fac-
tor were to be considered relevant.227
Second, the Panel ruled that the mere description or categorization
of 1) a charge or 2) the product subject to a charge, under the domes-
tic law of a Contracting Party equally cannot be decisive. If the Con-
tracting Parties could establish the "connection with importation" by
the mere description or categorization in their domestic law of the
charge, or the product subject to a charge, and thus determine which
GATT provisions apply, the basic objectives of articles II and III
could not be achieved. The Contracting Parties could then impose
charges on products after their importation simply by assigning the
collection of these charges to their customs administration and allocat-
ing the revenue to their customs revenue. 228 Thus, the Panel con-
cluded that the anti-circumvention duties cannot be considered to be
levied "on or in connection with importation" within the meaning of
article II(l)(b).
The Panel then examined whether the anti-circumvention duties
are contrary to article 111(2), which provides that "[t]he products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly,
to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." 229
The Panel noted that the EC had applied anti-circumvention duties in
accordance with article 13(10)(c) of Council Regulation (EEC) No.
2423/88 which provides that "[t]he amount of duty collected shall be
proportional to that resulting from the application of the rate of the
226. The panel, quoted in particular, the GATT panel Report in United States - Taxes on
Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Superfund Taxes), where the GATT panel held that
"[tihe tax adjustment rules of the General Agreement distinguish between taxes on products and
taxes not directly levied on products, they do not distinguish between taxes with different policy
purposes." (emphasis in original). See GATT, BISD, 34 Supp. 136, 161 (1988). See also INSIDE
U.S. TRADE supra note 221, at 3.
227. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE supra note 221, at 3.
228. See id.
229. See GATT, supra note 24.
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antidumping duty applicable to the exporter of the complete product
on the CIF value of the parts or materials imported." Hence, the
Panel concluded that the anti-circumvention duties are inconsistent
with article III(2).230
The Panel proceeded by examining whether the anti-circumven-
tion duties could be justified under GATT article XX(d), which pro-
vides that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any Contracting Party of measures:
... (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.... ." The
Panel identified the issue as being whether the anti-circumvention du-
ties ("measures") could be considered necessary in order to secure
compliance with the regulations imposing a definitive antidumping
duty on the importation of the finished product ("laws or regula-
tions"), which regulations, within the limits of its mandate and for
purposes of this proceeding only, it decided to assume as being not
inconsistent with GATT.231
In this respect, the EC argued that the term "secure compliance
with" should be broadly construed to cover not only the enforcement
of laws and regulations per se but also the prevention of actions which
have the effect of undermining the objectives of laws and regulations.
The Panel did not accept this broad interpretation. The Panel
noted that the text of article XX(d) does not refer to objectives of laws
or regulations but only to laws or regulations. 232 As for the purpose of
article XX(d), the Panel found that acceptance of such a broad inter-
pretation would mean that:
[w]henever the objective of a law consistent with the General Agreement
cannot be attained by enforcing the obligations under that law, the impo-
sition of further obligations inconsistent with the General Agreement
would then be justified under Article XX(d) on the grounds that this
230. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE supra note 221, at 3.
231. Although Japan had expressed doubts whether Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88
and the regulations imposing definitive antidumping duties on finished products were "not incon-
sistent" with GATT, the Panel noted that its terms of reference and the submissions by both
parties had been limited to the anti-circumvention provision and its application. See INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, supra note 221, at 4.
232. The panel further stated:
The examples of the laws and regulations indicated in Article XX(d), namely "those relating
to customs enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies... the protection of patents... and
the prevention of deceptive practices" also suggest that Article XX(d) covers only measures
designed to prevent actions that would be illegal under the laws or regulations. This conclu-
sion is further supported by the fact that the provision corresponding to Article XX(d) in
the 1946 Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organization used the terms "to
induce compliance with" while Article XX(d) of the General Agreement uses the stricter
language "to secure compliance with." (emphasis added).
See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 4.
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secures compliance with the objectives of that law. This cannot, in the
view of the Panel, be the purpose of Article XX(d): each of the exceptions
in the General Agreement - such as Article VI, XII or XIX - recognizes
the legitimacy of a policy objective but at the same time sets out conditions
as to the obligations which may be imposed to secure the attainment of
that objective These conditions would no longer be effective if it were
possible to justify under Article XX(d) the enforcement of obligations
that may not be imposed consistently with these exceptions on grounds
that the objective recognized to be legitimate by the exception cannot be
attained within the framework of the conditions set out in the
exception. 233
The Panel noted that only the individual EC regulations imposing de-
finitive antidumping duties give rise to obligations that require en-
forcement, namely the obligation to pay a specific amount of
antidumping duties, and that the anti-circumvention duties do not
serve to enforce the payment of antidumping duties. Therefore, the
Panel concluded that the anti-circumvention duties do not "secure
compliance with" obligations under the EC's Antidumping Regula-
tion and cannot be justified under article XX(d). 234
2. The Acceptance of Undertakings Under Article 13(10)
Japan argued that the acceptance of undertakings within the
framework of article 13(10) of the Code to limit the use of imported
parts and materials constituted a "requirement" contrary to GATT
article 111(4) which provides in relevant part that:
[t]he products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
The Panel accepted Japan's argument:
The Panel considered that the comprehensive coverage (in Article 111(4))
of all laws, regulations or requirements affecting "the internal sale etc. of
imported parts suggests that not only requirements which an enterprise
is legally bound to carry ... but also those which an enterprise volunta-
rily accepts in order to obtain an advantage from the government consti-
tute "requirements" within the meaning of that provision." The Panel
noted that the EEC made the grant of an advantage, namely the suspen-
sion of proceedings under the anti-circumvention provision, dependent
on undertakings to accord treatment to imported products less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
their internal use. The Panel therefore concluded that the decisions of
the EEC to suspend proceedings under Article 13(10) conditional on un-
233. See id. (emphasis added).
234. See id. at 5.
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dertakings by enterprises in the EEC to limit the use of parts or materials
originating in Japan in their assembly or production operations are in-
consistent with Article III(4).235
3. Article 13(10) Itself
Japan argued that not only the measures taken under article 13(10)
but also article 13(10) itself constituted a violation of GATT. The
Panel noted that article 13(10) does not mandate the imposition of
anti-circumvention duties or other measures by the Community au-
thorities; it merely authorizes the Commission and Council to take
certain actions. The Panel held that the GATT provisions which Ja-
pan invoked impose upon Contracting Parties the obligation to avoid
certain measures, but not an obligation to avoid legislation under
which the executive authorities may possibly impose such measures. 236
Hence, the Panel concluded that, although it would be desirable if the
EC were to withdraw article 13(10), the mere existence of article
13(10) was not inconsistent with the EC's obligations under GATT.237
4. The Publication of Criteria for the Acceptance of Parts
Undertakings and the Administration of the Rules of
Origin for Parts and Materials
The Panel held that in view of its ruling that the anti-circumven-
tion duties and the acceptance of parts undertakings are contrary to
article 111(2) and (4), the issue whether the administration of the anti-
circumvention provision is contrary to article X is no longer
relevant. 238
B. The First Reaction of the EC
When the news of the GATT panel's findings leaked, the panel
report was announced in the press as a major victory for Japan. 239
235. See id. (emphasis added).
236. The panel referred again in particular to the GATT panel report in United States -
Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (Superfund Taxes), where the GATT panel
had stated:
[F]rom the perspective of the overall objectives of the General Agreement it is regrettable
that the Superfund Act explicitly directs the United States tax authorities to impose a tax
inconsistent with the national treatment principle but, since the Superfund Act also gives
them the possibility to avoid the need to impose that tax by issuing regulations, the existence
of the penalty rate provisions as such does not constitute a violation of the United States
obligations under the General Agreement.
GATT, BISD, 34 Supp. 136, 163 (1988). See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 6.
237. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 6.
238. See id.
239. See Dispute Panel Finds in Favor of Japan on Complaint about EC 'Screwdriver' Law, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 367 (Mar. 14, 1990); Japanese Win GA TT Dispute over EC 'Screwdriver'
Law, 1992 THE EXTERNAL IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (BNA) 5 (Mar. 23, 1990). See
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This was the first time Japan had resorted to a GATT dispute settle-
ment proceeding, and the positive result obtained in this proceeding by
Japan was seen as inducive to Japan bringing more cases and playing a
more assertive role in GATT. 24 °
The EC initially declined to comment on the panel's findings. 24'
However, in a press release of March 29, 1990, the EC stated:
The report has now been issued in definitive form to Contracting
Parties to the GATT. The findings do not appear to condemn the princi-
ple of the taking of measures to prevent circumvention of antidumping
duties by assembly of the product concerned in the Community, and
indeed, do not address the question of the compatibility of the Commu-
nity's legislation with the provisions of the GATT in general. The panel
appears to limit itself to an extremely narrow interpretation of Article
III and Article XX(d) of the GATT.
The result has been that the Panel has found the Community's appli-
cation of its anti-circumvention legislation not to be in conformity with
these Articles.
The Community is now examining the Report in detail and, follow-
ing this examination, it will decide what further attitudes or steps it
should take. 242
Behind the scenes, in an unusual, though not unprecedented, move,
the EC had contested the reasoning of the findings in a letter to the
panel, asking it to reconsider its conclusions. The panel had refused to
do so and in an equally unusual move responded by defending its find-
ings in a special statement to the GATT Council.
243
When the panel report was up for adoption at the GATT Council
meeting of April 3, 1990, the EC blocked the adoption stating that it
had not yet finalized its position. The United States and Canada
stated that they needed more time to study the report. Japan, Austra-
lia, South Korea and the ASEAN countries had urged the GATT
also Buchan, GA7T Upholds Japanese Complaint Against EC, Financial Times, Mar. 10, 1990, at
2, col. 2; Thomson, Japan Hopes GA TTRuling Ends EC 'Discrimination,' Financial Times, Mar.
13, 1990, at 9, col. 1; Dullforce, Japan Scores Victory Over EC on Duties, Financial Times, Mar.
29, 1990, at 24, col. 1.
240. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal reported on April 25, 1990, that Japan was considering
lodging a complaint in GATT against the U.S.' "Super 301" if it were to be named an an unfair
trader under that provision. See Japan Says It May Take U.S. to GA 77 Over Super 301, Wall St.
J., Apr. 25, 1990.
241. EC Mum on Press Report That It Lost GATT Case, Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1990.
242. Commission of the European Communities, Press Release (Mar. 29, 1990).
243. Dullforce, Brussels at Odds with GA 7T over Judgment, Financial Times, Apr. 4, 1990,
at 4, col. 1. The panel is reported to have stated that it is unrealistic to believe that the current
review body, the GATT Council, can substantially amend the findings of the panel. The Council
could only decide either to adopt the conclusions or to block them, with all the resulting political
consequences. See Trade Policy: The European Commission's Objections to the Conclusions of the
GA TT Panel on the 'Screwdriver' Aspects of the Antidumping Policy, Agence Europe No. 5235, at
7 (Apr. 13, 1990).
Summer 1990] 1183
1184 Michigan Journal of International Law (Vol. 11:1119
Council to accept the Panel's findings.244
Since then, the EC's criticism of the GATT panel report has be-
come even more outspoken. 245 However, in the GATT Council meet-
ing of May 16, 1990, the EC lifted its objections to the adoption of the
report, thereby paving the way for the Council to adopt it officially. 246
C. The Implications of the Panel Report for the
Anti-Diversion Debate
It should be noted that the GATT panel did not rule on the ques-
tion whether the anti-circumvention duties under article 13(10) of the
Code would be allowed under article VI(6)(a). 247 In view of the fact
244. Nullis, Some EC Duties Are Again Ruled to be Unlawful, Wall St. J., Apr. 4, 1990; EC
Blocks GATT Adoption of Report on 'Screwdriver' Antidumping Case, 1992- THE EXTERNAL
IMPACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (BNA) 1 (Apr. 6, 1990). India, Brazil and Pakistan also
said to need more time to study the report although they were in favor of the basic position taken
by the panel.
245. Mr. Christoph Bail, the EC delegate to GATT reportedly stated that "[a]t this prelimi-
nary stage, the report gives us cause for serious concern and a series of questions," and "[i]f the
adoption of panel reports by the Council has any meaning beyond a blind rubber stamp, then I
am sure we can expect serious consideration of these concerns and questions." In particular, Mr.
Bail criticized the panel for not satisfactorily addressing the distinction between a duty levied in
connection with importation and an internal tax. Furthermore, Mr. Bail reportedly stated that
the panel seemed to "fundamentally misrepresent the very nature of GATT and ignore the well.
established principles of interpretation of international agreements," and "[t]he panel's reasoning
seems to amount to saying that since the GATT does not provide for measures to counter the
circumvention of the purposes of GATT norms, such measures cannot validly be taken." See EC
Blocks GA 7T Adoption of Report on 'Screwdriver'Antidumping Case, 1992-THE EXTERNAL IM-
PACT OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION (BNA) (Apr. 6, 1990). Mr. Bail's first statement is reminis-
cent of the EC's (solitary) position during the Tokyo Round negotiations where the EC
reportedly made a proposal that panels discuss their findings with the disputants. See Patterson,
The European Community as a Threat to the System, in TRADE POLICY IN THE 1980S 223, 239
(Cline ed. 1983), who states:
Another EC proposal others found particularly worrisome was that before finalizing its find-
ings and recommendations, the panel be required to "discuss" them with the disputants so
that, it was argued, the panel not make a serious mistake, because it had overlooked some
important piece of evidence or argument, had misinterpreted the GATT, or had unwittingly
ignored an important precedent. This proposal immediately ran into strong opposition on
the grounds that it amounted to reopening the case after all the agreed procedures had been
gone through and that it would subject the panel to intolerable pressure -especially if a large
trading country or entity was involved. This proposal was, in the event, not pressed.
Mr. Bail's second statement seems to ignore the panel reports in the Canadian FIRA legislation
case, GATT, BISD, 30 Supp. 140 (1984) and the Section 337 case (not yet reported).
246. See Dullforce, EC Defers to Screwdriver Ruling, Financial Times, May 17, 1990, at 4,
col. 7. It should be noted that the EC has reportedly stated that it will not amend its circumven-
tion rules "until it has seen the outcome of the talks on dumping and circumvention in the
Uruguay Round trade talks." Id.
247. The EC had not defended its anti-circumvention duties under article VI but relied solely
on article XX(d). The Panel noted:
The United States, as an interested third party, had argued that Article VI of the General
Agreement provided to a certain extent a legal basis for measures to prevent what it consid-
ered to be circumvention of antidumping duties. At one point in the proceeding the EEC
stated that, if the Panel were to find that anti-circumvention duties were justifiable under
Article VI,"it would not disagree" with such an approach. However, the EEC presented no
arguments in support of a justification of its measures under Article VI, on the contrary, in
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that article VI(6)(a) 24s requires a positive finding of dumping and re-
sulting injury, it seems improbable that the anti-circumvention duties
levied on the imports of parts under article 13(10) would be compati-
ble with article VI, in the absence of any findings that the parts are
actually dumped and causing injury to the domestic industry produc-
ing the parts.
At first blush, a way out might be finding that the finished product
on the one hand, and subassemblies respectively parts thereof on the
other hand, are to be considered as "like products. ' 249 Hence, if
dumping and injury are found with regard to imports of the finished
product, this determination could be stretched to cover subassemblies
and parts without violation of article VI. However, such a solution
runs into problems with the "like product" definition. 250 In article VI,
the term "like product" is only alluded to in article VI(1), dealing with
the definition of dumping. With regard to injury, article VI(6)(a) stip-
ulates that injury should be caused to the "domestic industry," with-
out specifying that it should be the domestic industry of the "like
product." Moreover, article VI does not define the term "like
product."
In a report adopted by a Group of Experts on May 13, 1959, on
the interpretation of article VI, however, these gaps were filled. The
Group agreed that the term "like product":
should be interpreted as a product which is identical in physical charac-
teristics subject, however, to such variations in the presentation which
are due to the need to adapt the product to special conditions in the
market of the importing country (i.e, to accomodate different tastes or to
meet specific legal or statutory requirements). 251
With regard to the term "industry" in relation to the concept of injury
the same Group of Experts concurred that:
[e]ven though individual cases would obviously give rise to particular
problems, as a general guiding principle judgements of material injury
the subsequent proceedings the EEC continued to present various arguments to the effect
that measures under Article 13(10) were "necessary" within the meaning of Article XX(d)
because Article VI did not provide a basis for the application of measures to prevent circum-
vention of antidumping duties. In conformity with the practice of panels not to examine
exceptions under the General Agreement which have not been invoked by the contracting
party complained against.., and not to examine issues brought only by third parties... the
Panel decided not to examine whether the anti-circumvention duties could be justified under
Article VI of the General Agreement.
See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 3.
248. Technically, the combination of article VI(l), VI(2) and VI(6)(a). See supra note 22.
249. This seems to be the approach taken by the Commerce Department. See supra notes 61-
95 and accompanying text.
250. For a somewhat different perspective, see Baker, "Like" Product and Commercial Real-
ity,, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACrICE, supra note 4, at 287-94.
251. See GATT, supra note 24, at 149. See also E. VERMULST, supra note 72, at 509-10.
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should be related to total national output of the like commodity con-
cerned or a significant part thereof. 252
In view of this report of the Group of Experts, it became com-
monly accepted 253 that article VI should be construed as requiring a
determination of dumping and injury with regard to the domestic in-
dustry producing the "like product" thus defined. This view was cor-
roborated by the Kennedy Round254 and Tokyo Round 255 GATT
Anti-Dumping Codes.
We have seen above256 that the "like product" definition given in
article 2(2) of the current GATT Anti-Dumping Code is very narrow.
Under this definition, it seems futile to contend, for example, that a
computer printer and a transformer, employed as a part or subassem-
bly in a computer printer, are "like products." Indeed, a computer
printer and a transformer are neither identical nor have closely resem-
bling characteristics. This is so even if the transformer is dedicated
exclusively for use in the computer printer.
In view of the positive requirement of article VI(6)(a) and the
later-adopted "like product" and "domestic industry" definitions,
findings of dumping and resulting injury with regard to a finished
product therefore cannot be extended to its parts and subassemblies,
without there having been a separate determination that the parts are
actually dumped and thereby have caused injury to the domestic pro-
duction of the "like product," i.e., the parts, in the importing
country.257
252. See GATT, supra note 24, at 150 (emphasis added).
253. See R. DALE, supra note 48, at 79.
254. See GATT, supra note 27, at arts, 2(a), 2(b), 3(d).
255. See GATT, supra note 3, at arts. 2(l), 2(2), 3(5).
256. See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text.
257. GAIT case law, specifically the U.S. Wine and the Canadian Beef cases, confirms this.
In the U.S. Wine case, the EC challenged the 1984 U.S. Wine Equity Act which required the ITC
to include, by way of exception to the normal definition of 'domestic industry,' the U.S. produ-
cers of the principal raw agricultural product, i.e., the grapes, used in the production of the
finished product, i.e., the wine, in the definition of the domestic industry for purposes of an-
tidumping and countervailing duty proceedings. GATT, United States - Definition of Industry
Concerning Wine and Grape Products, SCM/71 (Mar. 24, 1986). In the Canadian Beef case, the
EC attacked the twin determinations of the Canadian Import Tribunal that Canadian cattlemen
were allowed to bring a countervailing duty case against European boneless beef producers and
that Canadian cow-calf and feedlot operators were producers of a product "like" the imported
European boneless beef. GATT, Canada - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of
Manufacturing Beeffrom the EEC, SCM/85 (Oct. 13, 1987). In both cases, GATT panels have
agreed with the views of the EC that such interpretations violate article 6(5) and footnote 18 to
article 6(1) of the Subsidies Code. GATT, BISD, 26 Supp. 56 (1980). In other words, even
though grapes and 'cows' are the main inputs for the production of wine and beef, respectively,
and even though in economic terms domestic cattlemen and grape growers may suffer injury as a
result of imports of wine and beef, this does not authorize assimilation of the two distinct like
products and the two distinct industries, simply because the legal definitions in GATT article VI
and the Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Codes do not allow it. An important rationale for the
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The Panel's reasoning that "each of the exceptions in the General
agreement - such as articles VI, XII or XIX - recognizes the legiti-
macy of a policy but at the same time sets out conditions as to the
obligations which may be imposed to secure the attainment of that
objective"258 would appear to imply that the Panel would have been
unlikely to disregard the clear positive requirements in article VI(6)(a)
about the establishment of dumping and resulting injury or allow for
the adoption of certain "presumptions" of dumping and resulting in-
jury in anti-diversion cases. In this respect, the Panel report seems to
have broader implications for the debate on anti-diversion rules and
seems to unquestionably go beyond a condemnation of the EC anti-
circumvention rules on mere "technicalities." Finally, the Panel's rul-
ing that article XX(d) cannot be construed as an escape clause under
which Contracting Parties can by-pass the conditions set forth in arti-
cle VI in order to achieve the "policy objectives" recognized by article
VI, precludes an "easy way out."
The above discussion leads to two final remarks. First, the panel
ruling justifies profound doubts as to whether under current GATT
rules and GATT interpretations, the U.S. 1988 anti-circumvention
provision would survive GATT scrutiny. Second, the fact that article
VI only refers to "like product" in article VI(l) and does not clearly
define the term, implies that - if the Contracting Parties would feel
the need to introduce short-cut anti-diversion rules concerning the im-
portation of parts and subassemblies - one possibility of avoiding an
amendment of article VI would be to redefine the term "like
product." 259
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the opinion of these authors, it is preferable that an agreement
on diversion be reached within the Uruguay Round to prevent signato-
ries from adopting unilateral methods of dealing with diversion. This
means that it is recognized that some forms of diversion do constitute
a problem. On the other hand, the attention that diversion receives
panels' decisions in both cases would seem to have been that the Subsidies and Anti-Dumping
Codes provide very precise definitions of both 'like product' and 'domestic industry' and that
article VI itself (and therefore the whole Code) is essentially an exception to the GATT tariff
binding and most-favored-nation principles.
258. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 221, at 4 (emphasis added).
259. Compare Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and the
USA: Have Antidumping Laws Become A Problem in International Trade?, in ANTIDUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 464. From the EC's point of view, this might not be a
desirable option because it would expose the EC's exports of processed agricultural products to
antidumping complaints by growers, as was the case already in the U.S. Wine and the Canadian
Beef cases, discussed in note 257, supra.
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from certain industry lobbies and the administering authorities in
countries such as the U.S. and in the EC seems to warrant certain
preliminary remarks before tackling the question whether new rules
are necessary.
A. Preliminary Remarks
1. The Two Sides of the Coin as Regards the Interests of the
Domestic Industry in the Importing Country
Recent proposals for more rigorous antidumping laws and more
stringent anti-diversion measures would seem to be inspired by disap-
pointment of domestic industries in the importing countries, appar-
ently mainly in the United States and the EC, about the effectiveness
of the relief offered by a successful antidumping action and frustration
in the face of continuing competition by the sanctioned producers.
However, it should be recalled that the basic sanction envisaged by
current antidumping law is to offset injurious dumping, once it is es-
tablished, through the imposition of antidumping duties. The fact that
antidumping laws do not grant damages for injury suffered 26° (and,
indeed, do not even prohibit dumping as such), 261 means that the com-
plainants in an antidumping action can only rightfully expect that
bringing a meritorious action will stop the imports from being "injuri-
ously dumped." They cannot exact any real compensation nor any
protection from these competing imports altogether in the form of ef-
fective exclusion of offending exporters from the market.
Inherent in the current GATT system, aimed at free world trade,
is that "fair imports" cannot be stopped. 262 The commercial reality
260. An exception to this would be section 801 of the American Revenue Act of 1916 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988)) authorizing imposition of fines on foreign producers (and award of
treble damages to the plaintiff) which sold their products at lower prices in the United States
than in their domestic market with the intent to destroy or injure a U.S. industry or restrain its
development. The Act has never been successfully invoked. For discussions of the 1916 Act, see
Almstedt, International Price Discrimination and the 1916 Act: Are Amendments in Order?, 13
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 747 (1981); Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Redis-
covery of the Predatory Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAw. 227 (1977); Neville, The Antidump-
ing Act of 1916: A War-Time Legacy, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 535 (1981); Sidak, A Framework
for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act: Lessons from Antitrust Economics, 18 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 377 (1982). The 1916 Act is grandfathered under GATT. See Hansen & Vermulst, The
GA TT Protocol of Provisional Application.: A Dying Grandfather?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
263, 304-305 (1989).
261. See Jackson, Dumping in International Trade:.Its Meaning and Context, in ANTIDUMP-
ING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 8-9.
262. Except for actions conducted in conformity with GATT article XIX. See, e.g., R.
QUICK, EXPORT-SELBSTBESCHRAENKUNGEN UND ARTIKEL XIX GAIT (1983); M.C.E.J.
BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL TRADE RELATIONS
(1985); Koulen, The Non-Discriminatory Application of GATT Article XIX.: A Reply, 2 LEGAL
ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 87 (1983); Petersmann, Economic, Legal and Political Functions of
the Principle of Non-Discrimination, 9 WORLD ECON. 113 (1986).
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will often be that exporters subject to antidumping measures will try
to maintain their presence on the market while avoiding actionable
unfair trade. As free world trade is universally perceived to be in the
ultimate interest of domestic industries of all GATT Contracting Par-
ties, any exceptions to the basic GATT principles, such as article VI,
should be interpreted restrictively. Domestic industries in the import-
ing countries should recognize, beyond the frustrations of a particular
antidumping case, that they also stand to gain from GATT. The mul-
tilateral nature of GATT also means that the domestic industry, com-
plainant in a case today, could become a defendant in a case
tomorrow.263 It would seem that few, if any, industries would be
happy to see the same stringent rules the application of which they
advocate with respect to others, applied to themselves. The potential
of certain measures backfiring does not always seem altogether real-
ized in the heat of the debate. Preserving elementary procedural safe-
guards and avoiding short-sighted protectionist tendencies in
antidumping laws is therefore in the long 'term interest of all
industries.
2. The Interests of a State in an Increasingly Globalized and
Interdependent World Economy
To delineate national trade interests in a globalized world economy
is not an easy task.264 Antidumping laws emerged at a time where the
problem at stake typically was to protect a locally-owned domestic
industry against unfair imports from foreign-owned producers firmly
located in another country.
However, the increasing globalization of the world economy and
the existence of multinational corporations as the main players on the
international trade scene have precipitated profound changes in the
nature of the issues at stake. First, in more and more cases, foreign-
owned "domestic" producers could start acting as complainants.265
Where it is easy for a State to identify its interests with locally-owned
domestic industries, there still remains a natural political bias towards
favoring "local capital" above "local production" in case of conflicts
between the two. This is especially the case where the foreign export-
ers, defendants in an antidumping action, at the same time have local
263. See E. VERMULST, supra note 72, at 465-66.
264. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, An Administrator's Look at Antidumping Duty Laws in United
States Trade Policy, in ANTIDUMPING LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 97, 100 (1979)
(regional meeting of the Amer. Soc. Int'l L.).
265. Rank Xerox, for example, was a major complainant in the EC proceeding concerning
Photocopiers from Japan. For a discussion about this and other cases raising similar issues, see
Vermulst & Waer, supra note 136.
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production facilities in the importing country. Moreover, locally-
owned producers often also have production facilities in third coun-
tries, so that it is not always obvious whether granting antidumping
protection to these producers will indeed result in an increased pro-
duction in the importing country, or in paving the way for imports by
these locally-owned industries from their third country production
subsidiaries. Second, the production process is becoming increasingly
mobile. Multinational corporations aim at optimally utilizing the
comparative advantages in different countries. In more and more
cases intricate questions regarding the origin of products arise.266 At
the same time, the difficulty in pinning down multinational corpora-
tions makes their penalization as offenders of the antidumping laws
more problematic. In fact, it is the country against which the case is
brought that effectively will be castigated, because multinational cor-
porations are likely to shift production to other countries in order to
face lower or no antidumping duty barriers. Paradoxically, one of the
acclaimed achievements of firmer antidumping and anti-diversion poli-
cies is a boost in foreign investment in the importing countries by
targeted foreign producers, 267 rather than the restoration of fair trad-
ing conditions for the domestic industries. To some extent, current
antidumping policies effectively amount to a battle between States for
"local production" by multinational corporations.
These realities cannot be ignored in the anti-diversion debate. As
far as the establishment of production facilities is concerned, aggres-
sive antidumping policies will cause a shift of production either to-
wards "low normal value" countries or towards the importing
country. Where these production migrations result in the avoidance
of "injurious dumping," the antidumping action should be deemed to
have spawned the desired outcome. There especially should be no bias
in favoring production in the importing country above production in
third countries.
3. U.S. and EC Anti-Diversion Mechanisms Compared 268
The U.S. and the EC have taken distinctive roads to counter the
266. See id. for more detail.
267. See de Clercq, Fair Practice, Not Protectionism, Financial Times, Nov. 21, 1988, at 29,
col. 1:
The Community's main concern ... was to guard against the flagrant circumvention of
antidumping duties while ensuring that the provisions did not deter genuine investment.
This aim seems to have been achieved. Direct investment from Japan into Europe increased
by about 90 percent in the year following the introduction of the [screwdriver] provisions.
268. Holmer & Bello, supra note 116, at 531, have observed that the U.S. circumvention
provision is "quite conservative compared to, for example, recently adopted and implemented
antidumping practices of the EEC with respect to 'screwdriver assembly' operations within the
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classic diversion situations. 269 The U.S. has stretched the "like prod-
uct" definition, 270 arguably beyond the limits set by GATT and the
1979 Code27' in order to enable it - under certain circumstances -
to bring imports of subassemblies, parts and components, imports of a
similar product now coming from country Y, or imports of slightly
altered or later-developed products within the scope of an antidump-
ing duty order on product x coming from country X.
The EC, "hemmed in by its strict like product rule, ' 272 has set up
a special procedure to act against diversion through establishment of
screwdriver plants in the EC. Third country assembly, on the other
hand, is appraised in the EC on the basis of application of origin rules.
Following the ruling of the GATT panel, the EC is presently re-think-
ing its position. It is possible that the EC will go in the U.S. direction.
This begs the question whether - for the international trading system
- the U.S. approach is any better.
On the one hand, the focus of the United States on value added
seems preferable to the EC's value-of-parts test (although it is less pre-
dictable). On the other hand, the U.S. provision ratione materiae
reaches much further than the EC's. Moreover, it would seem that
"relationship" is not a prerequisite for a finding of diversion in the
U.S. 273 Third, and perhaps most importantly, one should question
whether the U.S. system can simply be "transplanted" in the EC (or in
other systems) without a radical overhaul of certain other elements of
the EC system. This is because the systems for levying antidumping
duties are different in the two jurisdictions. In the United States, the
original antidumping investigation culminating in issuance of an an-
tidumping duty order, amounts only to an estimate of antidumping
duties to be paid. Actual antidumping duties are then taxed in the
EEC." In the view of these authors this statement is incorrect. First of all, the U.S.
circumvention provision goes much further than the EC's ratione materiae (although it is correct
that the operative test for determining third country and importing country circumvention
arguably goes less far than the EC's application of rules of origin to determine the former and of
article 13(10) to determine the latter). The statement is also slightly misleading because it does
not take into account the variety of other mechanisms the United States has installed over time to
counter various forms of diversion, discussed at supra notes 46-134 and accompanying text, none
of which have equivalents in the EC.
269. Compare Koulen, supra note 4, at 372.
270. Id.
271. See E. VERMULSr, supra note 72, at 518-526.
272. See Baker, supra note 250, at 290. Baker seems to ignore, however, that the EC's
"strict" like product definition follows directly and necessarily from GATT.
273. Indeed, the U.S. position would seem to be that circumvention can also occur between
two technically unrelated parties. See, e.g., Steel Jacks from Canada, supra note 73. Query
whether there is any difference of substance between the U.S. and the EC anti-circumvention
provisions on this point in view of the rather broad definition used by the EC Commission to
define relationship or association.
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course of an annual review on the basis of actual dumping margins on
transactions made during the preceding year. This would seem to in-
dicate that dumping calculations will be made also with regard to sub-
assemblies, parts and components or the finished product now coming
from country Y before antidumping duties are actually levied. 274
In the EC, however, antidumping duties are assessed prospec-
tively.275 Transplantation of the U.S.-type scope rulings in the EC
would therefore mean that the scope of application of an antidumping
duty on product x originating in country X would be enlarged to cover
subassemblies, parts and components of product x or product x com-
ing from country Y, without there ever having been a finding of dump-
ing and resulting injury and that antidumping duties would actually be
assessed on that basis.
B. To What Extent Does the Current Legislative Framework (minus
anti-diversion provisions) Offer Adequate Solutions to
Handle the Diversion Problem?
Antidumping law in theory would seem to suggest that all forms of
"diversion" can be handled within the existing framework:
If producer x sets up a manufacturing base within the import-
ing country in which he uses exporting country parts, the domes-
tic industry in the importing country can bring a complaint
against imports of such parts.276
If producer x sets up a plant in country Y, the domestic indus-
try can bring a complaint against country Y.
Constructed value could be used in cases where there is a like-
lihood that the merchandise produced by producer x in country
Y is exported to all sources at uniformly low prices because of
cross-subsidization by producer x's plant in country X.277
If producer x uses a dumped input purchased from a related
supplier, the domestic. industry of the downstream product can
bring a complaint against the downstream product in which the
cost of the dumped input could be construed.
If producer x slightly alters the product or develops a later
generation of the same product, an adequate product description
274. Therefore, the argument that antidumping duties are imposed without findings of
dumping is to a certain extent invalidated ex post facto.
275. The refund procedure is supposed to offer relief, but it has many practical defects. See E.
VERMULST, supra note 72, at 252-54.
276. This may, however, run into major practical problems.
277. This refers to the MNC situation, discussed in notes 46-60 and 209-214, supra.
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adopted in the course of the proceeding might alleviate many of
the potential problems.
Imposition of antidumping duties is conditional on the twin findings
that imports of product x, produced and/or exported by producer x
have been made at dumped prices and have caused material injury to
the domestic industry manufacturing product x. As GATT article VI
is by its very nature an exception to the crucial GATT principles of
tariff bindings and most-favored-nation treatment, it must be con-
strued narrowly.278
The diversion approaches suggested by the United States and the
EC essentially assume that the shifting of production facilities or
processes by producer x combined with a certain continued reliance on
parts originating in country X may substitute findings of dumping and
resulting injury with regard to the parts shipped by producer x from
country X or the finished product now coming from country Y, later-
developed or altered products. This assumption changes the nature of
the objectionable behavior from injurious dumping to certain global-
ization strategies or to the inherent characteristics of certain product
sectors.27 9 It is submitted that this assumption is an extraordinary
jump in logic which should be taken with more caution than thus far
has been the case.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the on-going and
ever-increasing globalization and specialization of the world economy
pose certain practical problems to the effective enforcement of an-
tidumping law that - proceeding on the assumption that there is de-
mand for an antidumping law as such 280 - need to be addressed.
If, for example, following imposition of antidumping duties, pro-
ducer x of product x sets up a manufacturing base for product x within
the importing country in which he uses a very substantial portion of
exporting country parts, and the parts are manufactured only cap-
tively in the industry concerned, both the determination of dumping
(how does one calculate normal value and export price?) and the de-
termination of injury (how does one calculate injury to domestic pro-
duction of parts for which there is no open market?) become rather
complicated. Such practical problems are compounded if the product
concerned is comprised of a multitude of parts.
278. Compare Messerlin, Antidumping Above All 2 (Feb. 20, 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
279. In ceftain industrial sectors, e.g., consumer electronics, it seems rather normal for prod-
ucts to have a short life cycle. Therefore, frequent product changes and product innovations are
a matter of course.
280. Not everybody agrees with this assumption.. See, eg., Davey, Antidumping Laws" A
Time for Restriction, in the 1988 proceedings of the FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE,
EUROPEAN/AMERICAN ANTITRUST AND TRADE LAW § VIII 1-41 (Hawk ed. 1989).
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More principally, if, for example, - following imposition of an-
tidumping duties on product x manufactured by producer x in country
X - producer x sets up a subsidiary in the importing country in
which he assembles product x with 100 percent country-X compo-
nents with negligible importing-country-value added, the reasonable
presumption of circumvention created by such behavior might be a
ground for establishment of a special expedited procedure. The expe-
dited anti-diversion procedure would be designed to serve as a short-
cut to replace findings of dumping and resulting injury with regard to
the parts coming from country X.281 This would alleviate the burden
both for the domestic industry of filing a new complaint and waiting at
least a year for relief and for the administering authorities in perform-
ing its investigative functions.
From a GATT-legal point of view, the suggested approach would
necessitate a redefinition of the like product to include - for purposes
of assessing diversion 282 - parts and components within the definition
of the like product provided that minimal value is added in the import-
ing country.
An expedited procedure might also be warranted in cases where
producer x's exports from country X are subject to antidumping duties
and producer x then starts producing the like product in and exporting
it from country Y, again with minimal third-country-value added.
From a GATT-legal point of view, such third-country assembly could
be captured under the transshipment problem. An interpretive note
could be adopted to the transshipment provision clarifying that margi-
nal production activities in a third country justify invocation of the
transshipment clause. This would authorize administering authorities
in the importing country to base normal value on either country of
origin (i.e., country X) or country of export (i.e., country Y).
In both situations, the clear circumvention (i.e., the nature of the
offense) justifies the adoption of special procedures to maintain the in-
terface function of the antidumping instrument. In all other cases,
special procedures risk becoming short-circuits in the world trading
system.
281. This assumes that adequate review and refund proceedings are in place to grant the
foreign producer immediate and effective relief justifying the de facto shift in burden of proof.
282. An unqualified broadening of the "like product" definition might also have repercus-
sions for other areas of antidumping law, especially the investigation of injury in the context of a
"normal" antidumping investigation.
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